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THE SUPREME COURT ENDORSES
"INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION":
BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE*
CREATES A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO EXCLUDE GAY MEN
Christopher C. Fowler**
Under the majority's reasoning, an openly gay male is
irreversibly affixed with the label "homosexual." That
label, even though unseen, communicates a message that
permits his exclusion wherever he goes. His openness is
the sole and sufficient justification for his ostracism.'
INTRODUCTION
The Boy Scouts of America ("BSA" or "Scouts") is one of the
United States' oldest and most revered organizations.2 It was
* 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
Brooklyn Law School Class of 2001; B.A., University of California Los
Angeles, 1991. The author would like to thank Professor Nan Hunter, the staff
of the Journal of Law and Policy, and in particular, Michael Hatzimichalis. He
would also like to thank John and Jackie Fowler, Joshua Bauchner, and John
Schroeder, for their love and support.
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2476 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("Dale").
2 See Founders of Scouting and the BSA, at http://www.scouting.org/fact-
sheets/02-211 .html (last visited Apr. 7, 2001) (providing a history of scouting
and biographies of key individuals responsible for the founding of BSA in the
United States); Historical Highlights - 1910's, at http://www.scouting.org/fact-
sheets/02-51 l/1910.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2001) (noting how the organization
was first incorporated in Washington, D.C. in 1910 and describing its develop-
ment over the first ten years); see also Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the
Public Sphere, 85 MINN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001) (discussing the history of
BSA, including the extent to which it has permeated modem American culture,
and noting that "[t]here is probably no private organization in the country which
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founded in 1910,3 and was granted a federal charter in 1916.'
Since its founding, more than eighty-seven million youths and
adults have been active in BSA.5 The success of BSA is due in
large part to its membership, which says that "[any boy between
the ages of eleven and seventeen can join."6 In fact, according to
a BSA publication, A Representative Membership, "[n]either the
charter nor the bylaws of the Boy Scouts of America permits the
exclusion of any boy."7
This explains why, when James Dale's membership from BSA
was revoked because he was gay after twelve years of exemplary
so promotes itself as an icon of citizenship as the Boy Scouts") (cited version on
file with the Journal of Law and Policy) [hereinafter Hunter, Accommodating the
Public Sphere].
3 Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1200 (1999) ("Dale IT').
4 36 U.S.C. § 30901 (2000). "Congress has the power to create corporations
as an appropriate means of executing powers conferred by the Constitution on
it or on the general government or any department or officer thereof." 18 C.J.S.
§ 22 (1995). Further, the Constitution provides that Congress, "as the local
legislature of the the [District of Columbia], has power, by special act or general
laws, to create corporations within the District of Columbia." Id. BSA "is a body
corporate and politic of the District of Columbia." 36 U.S.C. § 30901(a) (2000).
Title 36, within which BSA is incorporated, is the "Patriotic and National
Observances, Ceremonies, and Organizations." Id. The scope and authority of
Title 36 is unclear, as one court has noted: "Since it is difficult to conceive of
any express power underlying the congressional charter of incorporation for Little
League Baseball, the charter is itself a tenuous exercise of federal power.
Moreover, there being no underlying express power, the charter cannot be
deemed intended to effectuate any substantive policy or purpose." Nat'l Org. for
Women, Essex County Chapter v. Little League Baseball, 318 A.2d 33, 40 n. 4
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974). Currently, Title 36 includes charters for ninety
organizations, including the Agricultural Hall of Fame, 36 U.S.C. § 20101
(2000), The American Legion, 36 U.S.C. § 21701 (2000), the Ladies of the
Grand Army of the Republic, 36 U.S.C. § 130101 (2000), and The National
Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution, 36 U.S.C. § 153101
(2000).
' Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1200.
6 Id. at 1221 (emphasis added).
7 Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1215 (emphasis added). As the court noted, "the
booklet is emphatically inclusive." Id. The court went on to quote the booklet:
"We have high hopes for our nation's future. These hopes cannot flower if any
part of our citizenry feels deprived of the opportunity to help shape the future."
Id. (quoting pamphlet, A Representative Membership).
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service,' he sued them for violating New Jersey's public accom-
modation law, the Law Against Discrimination ("LAD"). 9 In Dale
v. Boy Scouts of America ("Dale I1"),'o the New Jersey Supreme
Court unanimously sided with James Dale, holding that BSA was
appropriately subject to the state's LAD, and thus its revocation of
Dale's membership was unlawful." In its 1999-2000 term,
however, the United States Supreme Court decided Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale ("Dale"), rejecting the New Jersey Supreme
Court's interpretation of First Amendment law, and holding 5-4
that the LAD's application to BSA, in this context, was unconstitu-
tional. 
12
The LAD is similar to other state public accommodation laws
in that it defines "places of public accommodation" and then
defines the groups that are protected from discrimination within
those places. 3 The LAD uses a very broad and inclusive approach
to define a "place of public accommodation,"' 4 and the New
8 Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1204. "Dale was an exemplary scout." Id. See infra
Part II (detailing James Dale's involvement with BSA).
9 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 to -49 (West 1999). The LAD provides, in part,
that "[aill persons shall have the opportunity ... to obtain all the accommoda-
tions, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommodation,
... without discrimination because of ... affectional or sexual orientation." Id.
§ 10:5-4.
'0 734 A.2d 1196 (1999).
" Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1230. "Today, we hold that Boy Scouts is a 'place
of public accommodation' and is, therefore, subject to the provisions of the
LAD." Id.
12 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449.
13 See generally Lisa G. Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Discrimination
in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommoda-
tion Laws, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 238-72 (1978) (analyzing
the variety of ways in which states have defined places covered and groups
protected by the statutes).
14 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West 1999). The statute begins by stating that,
"'[a] place of public accommodation' shall include, but not be limited to ...
Id. It then lists a broad range of businesses, locations, and types of activities. Id.
This method is called the "qualified list" method, and is considered "a
compromise between the vagueness of a general definition, and the rigidity of an
unqualified list. It offers both flexibility and guidance." Lerman & Sanderson,
supra note 13, at 243.
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Jersey Supreme Court consistently has interpreted the definition
broadly.'5 Further, the LAD has been updated regularly to broaden
the classes of people that fall within its protective reach; in 1991,
the New Jersey Legislature amended the LAD to include protection
based on "affectional or sexual orientation."'
' 6
BSA's policy of limiting its membership had been subject to
public accommodation law challenges before Dale brought suit
under the LAD. 17 Prior to the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision that BSA qualified as a public accommodation under the
LAD, however, no other state supreme court or federal jurisdiction
had held that BSA was subject to a state public accommodation
law.' 8 This first-ever state supreme court holding that BSA was
subject to a public accommodation law set the stage for the next
chapter in the debate: whether application of a state public
accommodation law to BSA would infringe on that organization's
First Amendment freedom of association - a federal constitutional
right. 9
'5 Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1208. "[T]he Legislature has directed that the LAD
'shall be liberally construed.' We have adhered to that legislative mandate by
historically and consistently interpreting the LAD "with that high degree of
liberality which comports with the preeminent social significance of its purposes
and objects."" Id. (quoting Andersen v. Exxon Co., 446 A.2d 486 (N.J. 1982)
(quoting Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 308 A.2d 649 (N.J. 1973)).
16 Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1200; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West
1999).
"7 Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993); Curran
v. Mount Diablo Council, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998); Quinnipiac Council v.
Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352 (Conn. 1987);
Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, 891 P.2d 385 (Kan. 1995); Schwenk v. Boy
Scouts of America, 551 P.2d 465 (Or. 1976). See generally William F. Grady,
The Boy Scouts of America as a "Place of Public Accommodation": Develop-
ments in State Law, 83 MARQ. L. REv. 517 (1999) (analyzing the various cases
which have raised the question of whether BSA is a "place of public accommo-
dation").
18 See Grady, supra note 17, at 524-25.
'9 See Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1219. "Our holding that New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination applies to Boy Scouts requires that we reach Boy Scouts'
claim that its First Amendment rights are thereby violated." Id. In previous
actions brought against the BSA claiming protection under various public
accommodation laws, BSA always maintained that application of those laws
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In each of the previous occasions where state supreme courts
addressed the issue, the United States Supreme Court was not
poised to hear a further appeal, because the question turned
specifically on the interpretation of a state statute.2" As the United
States Supreme Court has made clear, it will only reconsider state
supreme court decisions when a federal question is raised: "The
State courts are the appropriate tribunals, as this court has repeated-
ly held, for the decision of questions arising under their local law,
whether statutory or otherwise."'"
After determining that BSA had violated the LAD when it
revoked Dale's membership, the New Jersey Supreme Court then
had to assess BSA's freedom of association argument: did forcing
Dale's inclusion violate BSA's constitutional freedom of associa-
tion. The court applied United States Supreme Court precedent on
the First Amendment question, finding that New Jersey's
compelling state interest to eliminate illegal discrimination trumped
the slight infringement to BSA's freedom of association.23 On this
question alone, the New Jersey Supreme Court decision was subject
to review. The Supreme Court accepted certiorariN on the
question of whether BSA's First Amendment freedom of associa-
tion was unconstitutionally infringed upon because the New Jersey
would infringe on its First Amendment freedom of association. See, e.g., Curran,
952 P.2d at 239 ("In light of our conclusion that the judgment in favor of
defendant should be sustained on the basis of the initial statutory interpretation
issue, we have no occasion to pass upon the merits of the constitutional claims
also made by defendant.").
20 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2456 n.3.
21 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 626 (1874); see also Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (holding that the Court will recognize
jurisdiction to hear state supreme court opinions when the decision does not
clearly depend "on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds").
22 The leading case in this area is Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609 (1984). See also infra Part I.
23 Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1230. "For the reasons set forth in this opinion,
application of the LAD does not infringe on Boy Scouts' First Amendment
rights." Id. See also infra Part I.B.
24 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 865 (2000) (granting BSA's
request for certiorari).
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Supreme Court found that BSA was within the scope of the LAD,
and thus in violation of state law for excluding James Dale.
The United States Supreme Court rejected the New Jersey
Supreme Court's ruling, finding that BSA's freedom of association
had been violated.216 In the process, the Dale Court re-wrote the
law of freedom of association. 27 The Court accepted an argument
articulated by BSA that James Dale's membership would necessari-
ly force them to propound the view that homosexuality is moral,
holding that Dale's mere presence was sufficient to serve as a
proxy for the acceptance of the morality of homosexuality. This
aspect of the majority's opinion significantly confused the future
of free speech and free association claims. In addition, the Dale
Court ignored precedent, and accepted a type of discriminatory
argument it had previously deemed unconstitutional. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion not only denied James Dale access to
BSA - it constitutionalized the right to exclude gay men.
This Note focuses on this important constitutional concern. Part
I discusses the development of United States Supreme Court First
Amendment jurisprudence, looking in particular at the tension
between the First Amendment and public accommodation laws, and
analyzing in detail the law of freedom of association. Part II
analyzes the procedural history of the Dale decision, focusing on
the way the Dale Court reinterpreted Supreme Court precedent in
reaching its conclusion. Part III discusses how the United States
Supreme Court's handling of Dale resulted in the adulteration of
prior First Amendment jurisprudence, and the creation of a new
constitutional right to exclude gay men.
I. THE TENSION: DISCRIMINATION MEETS THE CONSTITUTION
For many, the idea that the state has a right to tell a private
organization who can claim access to its ranks seems to fly in the
face of improper government control over the private actor. It is a
25 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449 ("This case presents the question whether
applying New Jersey's public accommodations law in this way violates the Boy
Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association.").
26 Id.
27 See infra Part II.C.
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difficult conflict to resolve. Both sides in the disagreement have
compelling interests at stake:28 the organization wants to shape its
own boundaries, and the state wants to eliminate "invidious
discrimination" among its citizens. 21 "There is an inescapable
tension between First Amendment rights of association and anti-
discrimination laws., 30 As the states created and expanded their
public accommodation laws, 3' and the courts recognized and
articulated the freedom of association,32 the conflict finally found
its way to the United States Supreme Court in the Roberts
trilogy.
33
A. The History of Public Accommodation Laws
State public accommodation laws similar to the LAD were first
passed in the years following the Civil War.34 These statutes were
designed to prohibit "discrimination based on race and color in
places which provided certain essential goods and services., 35 A
28 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2456.
29 See Brief of Amicus Curiae State of New Jersey at 11, Dale, 120 S. Ct.
2446 (No. 99-699) ("In consistently holding that a state has a 'compelling
interest of the highest order' in 'eliminating discrimination and assuring equal
access to its citizens,' this Court has made clear that a state may define the scope
of its compelling interest.").
30 Brief of Society of American Law Teachers at 4, Dale 120 S. Ct. 2446
(No. 99-699).
3' See infra Part I.A.
32 See infra Part I.B.
13 See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988);
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Throughout this note, these cases
collectively will often be referred to as the Roberts trilogy. See also infra Part
I.C (documenting the development of the Roberts trilogy).
31 See Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere, supra note 2, at 31-43
(documenting the history of public accommodation statutes in the United States);
see also Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 13, at 238 (documenting the history
of state public accommodation laws that gained urgency in the 1960s, when
"demand for civil rights by activist groups" resulted in the passage of many
federal and state anti-discrimination laws).
3' Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 13, at 238.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
federal statute, the Civil Rights Acts of 1875,36 was the first
attempt at a national public accommodation statute, but the United
States Supreme Court eventually interpreted it to restrict only state
action.37 After nearly one hundred years, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act of 196431 to extend the federal government's
public accommodation law beyond just the state action doctrine.39
Thus, a complainant alleging discrimination in public accommoda-
tions can look to both federal and state law for protections.4n
Most public accommodation statutes developed specifically to
handle issues of race. 1 Over the years, however, many states
broadened the scope of their public accommodation laws, similar
to the expansion of New Jersey's LAD.42 States have expanded
their statutes in two ways: both increasing the concept of
"place, ' 3 and adding the numbers of groups covered by the anti-
36 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
17 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). "An individual wrongful act,
unsupported by state authority in the form of law, custom, or judicial or
executive proceedings was 'simply a private wrong, or a crime of the individual';
the person wronged had recourse only in the laws of the state." Lerman &
Sanderson, supra note 13, at 219 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2000). "All persons shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this
section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color,
religion, or national origin." Id. § 2000a(a).
" Lerman & Sanderson, supra note 13, at 219. The scope of the 1964 Act
was broader in part because of Congress' success at extending federal legislation
based on the Commerce Clause. "Title II was drafted to draw upon both
fourteenth amendment and commerce clause authority." Lerman & Sanderson,
supra note 13, at 220.
40 See, e.g., Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere, supra note 2, at 33-
34 (describing the scope of federal public accommodation statutes, and the
varying degrees of protection of the state public accommodation statutes).
41 See Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere, supra note 2, at 35 ("The
era in which public accommodations law began and became common ... was
dominated by an ideology of race.").
42 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2456; see also Lerman & Sanderson, supra note
13.
4' Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2455-56 ("Over time, the public accommodations laws
have expanded to cover more places.").
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discriminatory effect.44 This development, according to Chief
Justice Rehnquist, brought about the imminent clash with the
freedom of association: "As the definition of 'public accommoda-
tion' has expanded from clearly commercial entities ... to
membership organizations such as the Boy Scouts, the potential for
conflict between state public accommodations laws and the First
Amendment rights of organizations has increased. 'a
B. The Development of the Freedom of
Expressive Association
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a right to
associate under the United States Constitution in some way since
1937 when the Court incorporated the First Amendment into the
Fourteenth Amendment in De Jonge v. Oregon.46 In De Jonge, the
Court determined that "the right of peaceable assembly is a right
cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally
fundamental" - thus articulating an idea about "association"
without using the explicit term.47 This idea was furthered and
enhanced in 1958 in National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People v. Alabama.48 Assessing whether it was constitu-
tional to require a private organization to turn over its membership
lists to the state, the Court stated unequivocally: "It is beyond
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement
of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured
4 Id. at 2455 n.2 ("Public accommodations laws have also broadened in
scope to cover more groups."); see also Hunter, Accommodating the Public
Sphere, supra note 2, at 33-34 ("As to the scope of who is protected, state law
prohibits three major bases for discrimination that federal law does not. The most
common is sex discrimination, which is banned by 43 state statutes. Of those 43
laws, 10 also prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.") (citations ommitted).
45 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2456. "Chief Justice Rehnquist suggests strongly in his
opinion for the Court that the conflict is unnecessary, that the Boy Scouts should
never have been covered by the New Jersey statute in the first place, that public
accommodations laws should stick to their traditional focus." Hunter, Accommo-
dating the Public Sphere, supra note 2, at 31.
46 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
47 Id.
48 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
embraces freedom of speech. 49 Consequent to this right of
association is the freedom not to associate, which the Court
recognized in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education.5 ° The Court
also has recognized a right of intimate association flowing from the
Bill of Rights,5' which is often analyzed as a part of the freedom
of association, generally.5"
49 Id. at 460 (emphasis added); see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430
(1962) ("[Tlhere is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments protect certain forms of orderly group activity."); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 523 (1960) ("[I]t is now beyond dispute that freedom of association
for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances is protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States.");
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("Our form of government
is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in
political expression and association."); see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23 ("An
individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the
redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the
State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends
were not also guaranteed.").
50 431 U.S. 209, 233-34 (1977). "Equally clear [as the freedom of
association] is the proposition that a government may not require an individual
to relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment." Id. at 234.
5' JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1118
(5th ed. 1995) [hereinafter NOWAK & ROTUNDA); see also Andrew M. Perlman,
Public Accommodation Laws and the Dual Nature of the Freedom of Association,
8 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 111 (1997-98). The concept of a right of
intimate association was first recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1964) (finding a "penumbra" of privacy that protects the right of married
couples to access contraceptives). The Court ultimately narrowed the types of
intimate relationships protected to "those that attend the creation and sustenance
of a family," Roberts, 486 U.S. at 619; including marriage, Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding that the right to marry is fundamental); childbirth,
Carey v. Populations Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that
it is a fundamental right to decide whether to procreate); and cohabitation with
one's relatives, Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that the
right of a non-nuclear family is a cognizable liberty interest). Factors that have
been used to determine what is and is not an "intimate association" include: size,
purpose, policies, selectivity and congeniality. See Roberts, 486 U.S. at 620. The
Court has not recognized a new category of intimate association since 1978,
when it found that marriage is a fundamental right. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374.
52 See, e.g., Roberts, 486 U.S. at 618-22.
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The freedom of association flowing from the First Amendment
is not absolute, however.53 The Supreme Court has held that the
government is justified in imposing certain limitations on private
organizations when "regulations [are] adopted to serve compelling
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associa-
tional freedoms. 54 Although the early ideas were developed as far
back as the 1930s, and more thoroughly in the 1950s, it was not
until the 1980s that the conflict between the freedom of association
and application of state public accommodation laws made its way
to the United States Supreme Court.
C. The Intersection: First Amendment Protection and Public
Accommodation Laws
If the First Amendment is the proverbial rock, state public
accommodation laws are the hard place - and courts are the
intermediary responsible for determining either's primacy. This
"classic conflict[] in constitutional law: the tension between
equality and freedom,"55 has been brewing in the courts for over
two decades.56 As the scope of public accommodations laws has
expanded, so has the number of groups and institutions affected by
them.57 Eventually, the issue reached the United States Supreme
Court.
The first case that made it to the Supreme Court was Roberts
v. United States Jaycees,58 in 1984. The Jaycees claimed that the
forced inclusion of women, mandated by the Minnesota Human
Rights Act, violated its First Amendment right of association.59
" Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451 ("But the freedom of expressive association, like
many freedoms, is not absolute."); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 ("The right to
associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute.").
" Roberts, 486 U.S. at 623.
5' Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere, supra note 2, at 1.
16 See generally Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612; see also Part I.C.1-4.
5" See, e.g., Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2455-56 (discussing the expanding scope of
public accommodation laws).
58 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
'9 Id. at 612.
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The second case to make it to the Supreme Court, Rotary Interna-
tional v. Rotary Club of Duarte,60 also involved the exclusion of
women, this time from a local chapter of Rotary International.6'
The Supreme Court's decision in New York State Clubs Association
v. City of New York,62 upholding a facial challenge to a citywide
public accommodation law, represented the third case in what has
since become known as the Roberts trilogy.63 Finally, the Court
decided Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston,64 suggesting a possible change to the fairly settled law
of the Roberts trilogy.
1. Foundations of Supreme Court Precedent:
The Roberts Trilogy
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,65 the United States
Supreme Court articulated a balancing test for courts to apply when
assessing constitutional challenges to applications of state public
accommodation laws. The case involved two local chapters of the
Jaycees - another name for Junior Chamber of Commerce - in
Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota. 66 In 1974 and 1975, respec-
60 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
61 id.
62 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
63 See New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 1; Rotary, 481 U.S. at 537;
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609. Throughout this note, these cases collectively will
often be referred to as the Roberts trilogy.
64 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
65 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
66 Id. at 612. According to the Jaycees' bylaws:
[T]he objectives of the Jaycees... is to pursue: "such educational and
charitable purposes as will promote and foster the growth and
development of young men's civic organizations in the United States,
designed to inculcate in the individual membership of such organiza-
tion a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest, and as a
supplementary education institution to provide them with opportunity
for personal development and achievement and an avenue for
intelligent participation by young men in the affairs of their communi-
ty, state and nation, and to develop true friendship and understanding
among young men of all nations."
Id. at 612-13 (quoting the Jaycees' bylaws from the Appellee's Brief).
940
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tively, these local chapters began admitting women as regular
members. 67 According to the bylaws of the national Jaycees,
"regular" membership was limited to "young men between the ages
of 18 to 35. "68 Women were allowed to join, but only as associate
members, which did not allow them to "vote, hold local or national
office, or participate in certain leadership training and awards
programs. 69
In December of 1978, the national board of Jaycees ("Jaycees")
notified the two Minnesota chapters that a motion would be raised
at the next national board meeting to revoke their charters.7 ° In
response, the local chapters filed charges with the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights ("MDHR"), alleging that a revocation
of their charters by the Jaycees constituted a violation of the
Minnesota Human Rights Act ("Minnesota Act"). 71 The MDHR
found that the Jaycees were a "public accommodation" as defined
by the Minnesota Act, and that they were in violation of the
Minnesota Act for excluding women from general membership.
The Jaycees were ordered to cease and desist from taking any
action against the local chapters.72
The Jaycees filed a suit in federal district court in Minnesota,
seeking injunctive relief from the MDHR's order. The district court
first certified the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court as to
67 Id. at 614. At the time of the trial, women associate members made up
"about two percent of the Jaycees' total membership." Id. at 613.
68 Id. at 613.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 614. In the ten years between the local chapters' decisions to allow
women and the case coming before the Supreme Court, women made up a
"substantial portion" of the memberships and boards of directors of both
organizations. Id.
71 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (1982). The Minnesota Human Rights Act
provided, in part: "It is unfair discriminatory practice: To deny any person the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color,
creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex." Id. § 363.03(3)(a)(1). The
current version of this provision includes "marital status" and "sexual orienta-
tion" among the list of protected classes in this section of the Act. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 363.03(3)(a)(1) (1999). For a thorough history of the Act, see United
States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 766-68 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1981).
72 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 616.
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whether the Jaycees were a "public accommodation" under
Minnesota law. 73 Upon an affirmative answer from the Minnesota
Supreme Court, the district court denied the Jaycees' application
for injunctive relief.74 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, reasoning that the "advocacy of political and public
causes" of the Jaycees was "not insubstantial," and thus, altering
their membership scheme was an infringement of their freedom of
association.75 The court held that the change in the membership
policies operated a "direct and substantial" interference with that
freedom because it would "necessarily result in 'some change in
the Jaycees' philosophical cast.",76 Further, the court held that the
state's interest was not "sufficiently compelling" to outweigh the
constitutional rights of the Jaycees, and that there were "less
71 See McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764. "What we decide here is that an
organization engaged in the business of seeking to advance its members and to
add to their ranks by assiduously selling memberships in this state is a 'public
business facility."' Id. at 774.
74 United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766 (D. Minn. 1982)
("Jaycees 1").
" United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1570 (8th Cir. 1983)
("Jaycees Ir').
76 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617 (quoting Jaycees II, 709 F.2d at 1571-72).
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intrusive" ways for the state to accomplish its anti-discrimination
goals. 7
The United States Supreme Court reversed in favor of the two
Minnesota chapters.78 In an extremely deliberate decision, the
Court set out the foundations upon which the constitutional
freedom of association relies. The Court first considered, and then
quickly dismissed, the possibility that the Jaycees qualified for
constitutional protection as an intimate association. 79 The Court
then defined the parameters within which a state public accommo-
dation law can operate without infringing on a group's freedom of
expressive association.80
The Court first credited the legitimacy of the state's objectives
in outlawing discrimination against minorities and recognized that
77 Id. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals suggested a number of ways that
the state could "express its displeasure with the Jaycees' discriminatory
membership practice, ways less directly and immediately intrusive on the
freedom of association." Jaycees II, 709 F.2d at 1573-74. These included:
State officials could be instructed not to appear at any function of any
discriminatory club, not to do any business with such a club, and to
give no official recognition to it. State officials and employees, at least
those above a certain level, could be instructed not to join such a club.
Those who seek public office or preferment may validly be required
to accept it cum onere, to divorce themselves from groups or activities
that indulge in invidious discrimination. Any state tax concessions, e.g.,
the deduction for charitable contributions, could be withdrawn. It could
be made unlawful (indeed, it may be already) for an employer to
subsidize an employee's membership in any discriminatory club, or to
give that membership any favorable weight in deciding whether to
promote an employee.
Id.
" Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.
'9 Id. at 618-22. The Court looked to the relevant factors, including "size,
purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a
particular case may be pertinent." Id. at 620. Because the Jaycees "are large and
basically unselective groups," and that an officer from one of the two Minnesota
chapters testified that "he could recall no instance in which an applicant had been
denied membership on any basis other than age or sex," the Court determined
that "Jaycees chapters lack the distinctive characteristics that might afford
constitutional protection" under the intimate association prong of freedom of
expression. Id. at 621.
'o Id. at 622-29.
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public accommodation laws play a role in accomplishing this
goal. 8 ' The Court then noted a comparable argument in support of
laws protecting minorities, referring to its various decisions under
the Equal Protection Clause.82 There, the Court articulated an
approach to judicial review that recognized how "archaic and
overbroad assumptions" relied upon in the formulation of many
laws were not sound bases upon which to justify discrimination.83
Thus, if in response to a public accommodation law challenge an
organization claimed First Amendment protection and then relied
on "archaic and overbroad assumptions ' 84 to justify the discrimi-
natory behavior, the state's compelling interest in overcoming the
discrimination would be especially strong.85
With the burden for proving justification for the discrimination
on the Jaycees, the Court found that "the Jaycees ... failed to
demonstrate that the [Minnesota] Act imposes any serious burdens
on the male members' freedom of expressive association. ' '86
81 Id. at 622-25. These laws, as the Court noted, are not "limited to the
provision of purely tangible goods and services." Id. at 625. The Court then
affirmed the general and broad scope of the Minnesota Act, acknowledging that
its "expansive definition reflects a recognition of the changing nature of the
American economy and of the imflortance, both to the individual and to society,
of removing the barriers to economic advancement and political social integration
that have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including women."
Id. at 626.
82 Id. at 625. The Court cited to Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 751
(1984) (holding that a pension offset plan for dependent husbands was
constitutional because it "directly and substantially related to [an] important
governmental interest"); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 733 (1982) (holding that a women only policy at the university's nursing
school was invalid); and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973)
(plurality opinion) (holding that classifications based on sex are "inherently
suspect" and subject to "strict judicial scrutiny").
83 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625.
84 Id.
85 Id. ("That stigmatizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities that
accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination on
the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race.").
86 Id. at 626. "There is ... no basis in the record for concluding that
admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization's
ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred
views." Id. at 627.
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Further, the Court concluded that all of the arguments proposed by
the Jaycees were in fact based on "archaic and overbroad assump-
tions" and thus invalid: "In claiming that women might have a
different attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school
prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations ... the Jaycees relie[d]
solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests
and perspectives of men and women. 87 The Court responded
severely: "We have repeatedly condemned legal decisionmaking
that relies uncritically on such assumptions ... [and] we decline to
indulge in the sexual stereotyping that underlies [the Jaycees']
contention."88
Finally, the Court acknowledged that application of the state
anti-discrimination law would impose a burden on the Jaycees, but
noted it "abridge[d] no more speech or associational freedom than
[was] necessary to accomplish [the state's legitimate] purpose."89
With broad strokes, the Court found that the Jaycees' limitation on
accepting women as "general members" was not a constitutionally
protected form of discrimination, 90 and that forcing the Jaycees to
accept women as full members did not infringe upon the Jaycees'
First Amendment right to associate. 9'
Justice O'Connor's lone concurrence approached the issue from
a different perspective.92 Justice O'Connor argued that it was a
better approach to interject into the analysis a threshold question:
7 Id. at 627-28.
88 Id. at 628. "In the absence of a showing far more substantial than that
attempted by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyping that
underlies appellee's contention that, by allowing women to vote, application of
the Minnesota Act will change the content or impact of the organization's
speech." Id.
" Id. at 629. The Court noted that the provision "responds precisely to the
substantive problem which legitimately concerns" the state. Id. (quoting City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)).
90 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628."[L]ike violence or other types of potentially
expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative
impact, such practices are entitled to no constitutional protection." Id.
91 Id. at 612.
92 Id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Brennan wrote the Court's
majority opinion. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment only. Chief Justice
Berger and Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision. Id. at 609.
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is the organization claiming First Amendment protection predomi-
nantly commercial or expressive in its activities? 93 Justice O'Con-
nor conceded that this determination can be a difficult one. 94 The
benefit to this approach, however, comes after the determination is
made: if the organization is commercial, then there is no need to
undertake an extensive First Amendment analysis, since "there is
only minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of commer-
cial association."95 Under her simplistic analysis, Roberts is an
easier case: "[n]otwithstanding its protected expressive activities,
the Jaycees - otherwise known as the Junior Chamber of Com-
merce - is, first and foremost, an organization that, at both the
national and local levels, promotes and practices the art of
solicitation and management., 96 Thus, in response to Justice
O'Connor's threshold question, the Jaycees would lose its First
Amendment protection claim because it is a commercial organiza-
tion and the state's compelling interest would overwhelm. 97
2. The Roberts Trilogy, Part H
In Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte,98 the second
case in the Roberts trilogy, the United States Supreme Court
9' id. at 633.
94 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636. "Determining whether an association's activity
is predominantly protected expression will often be difficult, if only because a
broad range of activities can be expressive." Id.
9' Id. at 634.
96 Id. at 639.
" Id. "The State of Minnesota has a legitimate interest in ensuring
nondiscriminatory access to the commercial opportunity presented by the
membership in the Jaycees. The members of the Jaycees may not claim
constitutional immunity from Minnesota's antidiscrimination law by seeking to
exercise their First Amendment rights through this commercial organization." Id.
at 640. See also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 51, at 1121. The authors of
this well-respected hornbook favor Justice O'Connor's theory. "Perhaps it is best
to think of associational rights as proceeding on a continuum from the least
protected form of association in commercial activities to the most protected
forms of association to engage in political or religious speech or for highly
personal reasons, such as family relationships." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
51, at 1121.
9' 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
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considered a factual scenario comparable to Roberts, and the results
were remarkably similar.99 The Rotary Club of Duarte, California,
admitted three women into active membership in 1977.00 When
Rotary International's board of directors threatened to revoke its
charter, the Duarte Club and two of the women members filed a
complaint with the California Superior Court under the Unruh Civil
Rights Act ("Unruh Act"), the state's public accommodation
law.' °' At trial, the court held that Rotary did not qualify as a
"business establishment" under the Unruh Act. 0 2 The court of
appeal reversed, and the California Supreme Court denied a petition
for review. 103
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, recogniz-
ing that application of the Unruh Act might implicate Rotary's First
Amendment rights,' 04 and affirmed the court of appeal decision
99 One commentator suggests that the Court took up Rotary in response to
criticisms of Roberts, "for its inadequate definition of the contours of the right
of association." Robert N. Johnson, Board of Directors of Rotary International
v. Rotary Club of Duarte: Redefining Associational Rights, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv.
141, 141 (1988).
'00 Rotary, 481 U.S. at 541. Rotary International is "an organization of
business and professional men united worldwide who provide humanitarian
service, encourage high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build
goodwill and peace in the world." Id. at 539. Although its membership was
limited to men, women were permitted to attend meetings, give speeches, and
receive awards. There were two Rotary-affiliated organizations to which young
women between fourteen and twenty-eight were allowed to join - Interact or
Rotaract. Id. at 541.
'0' CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 51 (West 1982). The Unruh Act provides in
part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no
matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or disability
are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever."
Id.
102 Rotary, 481 U.S. at 542. The court found that any business benefits
derived by Rotary clubs "are incidental to the principal purposes of the
association." Id.
103 Id. at 543.
'04 Id. at 543-44 & n.3. "We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final
judgment entered by the highest court of a State in which decision could be had
'where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground
of its being repugnant to the Constitution." Id. at 544 n.3 (citations omitted).
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matter-of-factly. 1°5 After dismissing the possibility that Rotary
was protected under the intimate association prong of the freedom
of association,1 6 the Court analyzed the nature of the club's First
Amendment claim. At the outset, the Court determined that "the
evidence fails to demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary
Clubs will affect in any significant way the existing members'
ability to carry out their various purposes."1 °7 Again, the Court
framed the issue deliberately: the organization claiming a First
Amendment protection has the burden of proving that its expressive
purpose would be compromised by application of the state law. In
this case, according to the Court, opening the club's membership
to women would improve Rotary's abilities to accomplish its stated
purposes.'0 8 Finally, in language affirming the rationale of Rob-
erts, the Court held that, to the extent any infringement was placed
on Rotary's expressive purpose, such infringement was justified by
the state's compelling interest in fighting discrimination.' 0 9
Justice O'Connor's absence in this decision was unfortu-
nate." Justice O'Connor likely would have elaborated more fully
her "predominantly commercial" analysis. Rotary developed its
membership by pulling individuals from various professions, who
then sponsored other individuals from the same line of busi-
ness."' Rotary's purposes, however, were described as far more
15 Id. at 544; see also Johnson, supra note 99, at 141 (suggesting that the
Court granted certiorari on Rotary at least in part to clarify its holding in
Roberts).
06 Rotary, 481 U.S. at 545-47. "We therefore conclude that application of
the Unruh Act to local Rotary Clubs does not interfere unduly with the members'
freedom of private association." Id. at 547.
107 Id. at 548.
"o8 Id. at 549; see also supra note 100 (describing Rotary's purpose).
19 Rotary, 481 U.S. at 549. "Even if the Unruh Act does work some slight
infringement on Rotary members' right of expressive association, that infringe-
ment is justified because it serves the State's compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination against women." Id.
"0 Justices O'Connor and Blackmun did not take part in this decision. Id.
at 538. The decision, in fact, was unanimous, although Justice Scalia concurred
only in the judgment. Id.
1" Id. at 540 (citing the Standard Rotary Club Constitution, Art. V, §§ 2-5).
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expressive in nature than the Jaycees. 12 How Justice O'Connor
would have evaluated this less obvious "commercial" organization
would have been instructive for elaborating on her alternative
theory. "'3
3. Roberts Trilogy, Part III
In the third case in the Roberts trilogy, New York State Club
Association v. City of New York ("NY Clubs"),"4 the Supreme
Court was asked to consider a facial challenge to a city ordinance
that applied a public accommodation anti-discrimination scheme to
any club with "more than four hundred members, [which] provides
regular meal service and regularly receives payment for dues, fees,
use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or
indirectly from or on behalf of non-members for the furtherance of
trade or business." 115 The challenge was brought by a statewide
association of more than 125 clubs, some of which fell within the
parameters of the city ordinance, Local Law 63.
112 Id. at 546.
We of course recognize that Rotary Clubs, like similar organizations,
perform useful and important community services. Rotary Clubs in the
vicinity of the Duarte Club have provided meals and transportation to
the elderly, vocational guidance for high school students, a swimming
program for handicapped children, and international exchange
programs, among many other service activities.
Id. at n.5.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 92-97 (discussing Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Roberts).
114 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
115 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (McKinney 1986). Local Law 63, as the
law was known, was an amendment to New York City's Human Rights Law of
1965, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (McKinney 1986). The purpose of the
amendment was to ensure that minorities and women have access to the broad
scope of public accommodations in the city. Id. "One barrier to the advancement
of women and minorities in the business and professional life of the city is the
discriminatory practices of certain membership organizations where business
deals are often made and personal contacts valuable for business purposes,
employment and professional advancements are formed." Id. § 8-102.
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The Supreme Court rejected the facial challenge, and in doing
so, the Court further defined the Roberts approach." 6 Explaining
that the law was not invalid in all circumstances, the Court noted:
It is conceivable, of course, that an association might be
able to show that it is organized for specific expressive
purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired
viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its
membership to those who share the same sex, for example,
or the same religion."7
This interpretation of the Roberts doctrine made it clear that in
order for a First Amendment challenge to trump a valid public
accommodation law, the "expressive purpose" of the organization
must be compromised." 8 When a law, however, "erects no
obstacle" in the fulfillment of that expressive purpose, then the
First Amendment will not protect the club." 9
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor applauded Local Law 63
as a "sensitive tool[]" in balancing the goals of public accommoda-
tion laws and First Amendment rights. 20 Justice O'Connor
maintained her commercial/expressive purpose distinction, however.
She recognized that there might be clubs with more than 400
members "whose expressive purposes would be substantially
undermined if they were unable to confine their membership to
those of the same sex, race, religion, or ethnic background, or who
116 NY Clubs, 487 U.S. at 8.
[T]o prevail on a facial attack the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
challenged law either "could never be applied in a valid manner" or
that even though it may be validly applied to the plaintiff and others,
it nevertheless is so broad that it "may inhibit the constitutionally
protected speech of third parties."
Id. at 11 (quoting City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789, 798 (1984)).
.1. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
"' See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
119 NY Clubs, 487 U.S. at 13. "Instead, the Law merely prevents an
association from using race, sex, and the other specified characteristics as
shorthand measures in place of what the city considers to be more legitimate
criteria for determining membership." Id.
120 Id. at 18 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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share some other such common bond."'' Likewise, "[p]redomin-
ately commercial organizations are not entitled to claim a First
Amendment associational or expressive right" regardless of their
size. 22 Interestingly, however, the Court again did not rely on
this distinction in the majority's holding.
13
4. How Hurley Altered the Landscape
After NY Clubs, the Roberts doctrine went unchallenged for
several years. In fact, it was relied on heavily in the state court
proceedings of Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston ("Hurley").124 The case involved the Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston ("GLIB"),
which purportedly formed solely to march in the annual Boston St.
Patrick's Day parade. 125 In 1992, the group's request to partici-
pate in the parade was initially rejected by parade organizers, the
South Boston Allied War Veterans Council ("Council"). 26 GLIB
eventually obtained a court order allowing it to march, however. In
1993, GLIB was again not allowed to march, and filed a lawsuit
21 Id. at 19. "The associational rights of such organizations must be
respected." Id.
122 Id. at 20.
123 Id. at 1.
124 515 U.S. 557 (1995); see also Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston v. Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1298-99 (Mass. 1994); Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. Boston, No. 921518,
1993 WL 818674, at *12-13 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Dec. 15, 1993).
125 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561. But see Gretchen Van Ness, Parades and
Prejudice: The Incredible True Story of Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade and
the United States Supreme Court, 30 NEW ENG. L. REv. 625 (1996). Ms. Van
Ness was counsel to GLIB, and argued that the trial court made no such finding
about GLIB's formative purpose. Id. at 652.
126 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561. The Veterans Council, "an unincorporated
association of individuals elected from various South Boston veterans groups,"
began its stewardship over the parade in 1947, when the city gave up that
responsibility. Id. at 560. The Council applies for and receives a permit from the
city each year, and the city in turn allows usage of its official seal, and provides
printing services and direct funding. Id. at 561.
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against the Council and John J. Hurley, a member of the Council,
individually. 127
The trial court held for GLIB, finding that the parade was a
covered entity under the state's public accommodation law, 28 and
thus the exclusion of GLIB was unlawful. 29 The court further
held that, since the expressive purpose of the parade was not
discernible with any specificity, there was no infringement of the
Council's First Amendment freedom of expressive association by
allowing GLIB to march. 30
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
("SJC") affirmed, finding no error on the part of the trial court, and
noting "that it was impossible to detect an expressive purpose in
the parade."' 3' The SJC held that because there was no "specific
expressive purpose," there was no infringement of any protected
First Amendment right. 32 The Council's appeal raised a freedom
of speech claim in addition to its expressive association claim
litigated at trial. 3 3 The majority ignored the new free speech
claim, determining that it was unnecessary to "decide on the
particular First Amendment theory involved."' 3 4 It was sufficient,
the court held, that "defendants had ... failed at the trial level 'to
127 The lawsuit named John J. "Wacko" Hurley, the named defendant in the
Supreme Court decision - hence the case's name. Id.
128 MASS. GEN. LAWS § 272 (1992) (prohibiting "any distinction, discrimina-
tion or restriction on account of ... sexual orientation ... relative to the
admission of any person to, or treatment in any place of public accommodation,
resort or amusement").
129 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 563.
130 Id. "[T]he court found it 'impossible to discern any specific expressive
purpose entitling the Parade to protection under the First Amendment."' Id.
(quoting Application to Petition for Certiorari at B25).
131 Id. at 564 (citing Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston v. Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1295-98 (1994)). The original claim made
by GLIB also named the city of Boston as defendant, but that claim was
dismissed by the trial court judge. Id. at n.2.
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demonstrate that the parade truly was an exercise of ... First
Amendment rights.'
',1 35
Judge Nolan, the sole dissenter, disagreed with the court's
assessment of Hurley's speech rights. 36 In an opinion that
ultimately had a significant impact on the United States Supreme
Court, Judge Nolan argued that even without any message, the
Council could not be forced to accept GLIB's message as its
own. 37 This positional switch - moving from traditional "expres-
sive association" analysis of the Roberts trilogy, toward the more
traditional "pure speech" jurisprudence championed by Judge
Nolan's dissent - set the stage for the Supreme Court's analy-
Si.138sis. 
After documenting the long history of Hurley, the United States
Supreme Court broadcast its intentions early by articulating the
question under consideration in free speech terms: "Whether the
requirement to admit a parade contingent expressing a message not
of the private organizers' own choosing violates the First Amend-
ment." 139 The Court unanimously reversed the SJC's decision and
held invalid the "peculiar way" in which the state's public
accommodation law had been applied. 4 ' Thus, despite the fact
that the original claim was based on the freedom of expressive
association, the Court analyzed the facts using a free speech
framework.
'3 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 564 (quoting Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston v. Boston, 636 N.E.2d at 1299).
136 Id. at 565 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
117 Id. "[E]ven if the parade had no message at all, GLIB's particular
message could not be forced upon it." Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705, 717 (1977)).
131 See infra Part III.A.2 (analyzing the difference between a traditional free
speech claim, and an expressive association claim).
"' Hurley, 515 U.S. at 566 (citing the Supreme Court's granting of
certiorari, 513 U.S. 1071 (1995)). It is worth noting that the presentation of the
issue for determination immediately followed the lengthy Nolan dissent. See id.
"4 Id. at 572. "Since every participating unit affects the message conveyed
by the private organizers, the state courts' application of the statute produced an
order essentially requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their
parade." Id. at 572-73.
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The core of the Court's decision was its interpretation of the
unique nature of the parade. 14' The Court stated that, as a matter
of law, parades are "a form of expression."'' 42 This finding under-
mined the trial court's decision, which relied on the notion that the
parade, missing any articulable message, could not be a form of
expression protected by the First Amendment. 43 The Court
elaborated that, in relation to the First Amendment protections that
should extend to parades, "a narrow, succinctly articulable message
is not a condition of constitutional protection. ' 44 The most
obvious parallel for this argument is to First Amendment protec-
tions of newspapers or cable television providers. 45 In both
141 "Real '[p]arades are public dramas of social relations, and in them
performers define who can be a social actor and what subjects and ideas are
available for communication and consideration."' Id. at 568 (citing SUSAN DAVIS,
PARADES AND POWER: STREET THEATRE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PHILADEL-
PHIA 6 (1986)).
142 Id. at 568. "Parades are thus a form of expression, not just motion, and
the inherent expressiveness of marching to make a point explains our cases
involving protest marches." Id.
141 Id. at 563.
'44 Id. at 569. "[A] private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection
simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to
isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech." Id. at
569-70. This holding would prove troubling for successive freedom of expressive
association claims, including Dale, because it complicated the apparently
consistent holdings of the Roberts trilogy. At the core of the expressive
association constitutional protection is the argument that what is being protected
is the very reason the association exists to begin with: namely, the purpose
behind the formation of the group. This purpose, which the trial court in Hurley
tried to determine for the parade, is a precursor to the existence of an associa-
tional protection under the First Amendment. If Hurley is consistently read to
make this requirement unnecessary for an associational protection after Dale,
then the strength of the Roberts doctrine is seriously weakened. See infra Part
HI.B; see also Kristine M. Zaleskas, Pride, Prejudice or Political Correctness?
An Analysis of Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROS. 507, 547-48 (1996) (observing that
"there now seems to be more confusion than before about how much of a
message is necessary to assert a right of 'expressive association').
145 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(holding that Florida's compulsory access law "fails to clear the barriers of the
First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors"); Turner
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instances, government can claim no right to force the inclusion of
any particular "voice" or "speech" that either entity would not want
to include.
46
This line of cases stems from free speech jurisprudence, and not
from freedom of expressive association case law. When the Court
acknowledged that a "speaker" has the right not to have his speech
altered, regardless of whether that speaker has a "particularized
message," it was invoking not the guidelines set forward in the
Roberts trilogy, but rather, those bedrock cases that rely upon the
freedom of speech. 147 Even in supporting the argument, the Court
referred to the "painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold
Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll." 148 This
clearly took Hurley's holding out of the context of freedom of association. 49
Throughout its opinion, the Court had barely acknowledged the
Roberts doctrine.150 Finally, in the penultimate paragraph, the
Court invoked NY Clubs.'5' In dicta, the Court recognized that
NY Clubs had upheld a facial challenge to a city public accommo-
dation statute, but the Court also had held that "the State did not
prohibit exclusion of those whose views were at odds with
positions espoused by the general club memberships."' 52 The
Court thus expressed the Roberts balancing test in yet another way:
where the "manifest views" of an individual are "at odds with a
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (holding that cable
programmers and operators are "entitled to the protection of the speech and press
provisions of the First Amendment").
146 Id.
147 See, e.g., Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (1974) (newspapers have a right to
claim freedom of speech); Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 636 (1994) (cable
programmers and operators are entitled to freedom of speech).
148 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.
149 See supra Part I.C.1-3; see also Dale III, 706 A.2d at 292 ("Hurley is a
First Amendment speech case ... the Court was protecting a form of pure
speech, the collective expressive views of the parade itself.").
15o Each of the Court's citations to the Roberts trilogy were for points of
information, and not to support its rationale in deciding Hurley. See Hurley, 515
U.S. 557.
... Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580. "New York State Club Assn. is also instructive
by the contrast it provides." Id. (emphasis added).
152 Id. (citing NY Clubs, 487 U.S. at 13).
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position taken by the club's existing members," the club has a First
Amendment right to exclude that individual.
1 53
II. BSA JETTISONS ONE OF ITS OWN: AN EAGLE SCOUT
James Dale joined the Cub Scouts in 1978, when he was eight
years old. 54 He became a Boy Scout in 1981 and remained with
the Scouts until his eighteenth birthday in 1988. In his ten years as
a Scout, Dale earned twenty-five merit badges and was granted
many honors. 55 Just before leaving the Scouts at the age of
eighteen, Dale was awarded the Eagle Scout Badge, an honor
achieved by only the top three percent of all scouts. 5 6 Dale then
applied for and was granted membership in BSA as an Assistant
Scoutmaster of Monmouth Council Troop 73, where he had been
153 Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
154 Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1204. Dale first joined Cub Scout Pack 142. Id. In
1981, he became a member of the Boy Scout Troop 220. He joined Troop 128
in 1983, and Troop 73 in 1985, where he remained until his eighteenth birthday.
Id.
155 Id. While a member, Dale was an assistant patrol leader, patrol leader,
and bugler. Id. From 1985 to 1988, when he turned eighteen, he was a Junior
Assistant Scoutmaster for Troop 73. Id. Dale was invited to speak at "organized
Boy Scout functions," including the Joshua Huddy Distinguished Citizenship
Award Dinner. Id. He also attended the National Boy Scout Jamboree. Id.
Jamborees are national gatherings of scouts held periodically which have as their
goal to "reflect the skills of Scouting, the nation's heritage, physical fitness,
conservation, and the spirit of brotherhood." 2001 National Scout Jamboree,
Program Activities, at http://www.scouting.org/jamboree/program.html (last
visited Apr. 8, 2001).
156 Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1204; see also BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, BOY
SCOUT HANDBOOK 179 (lth ed. 1998) (noting that "[f]ewer than 4% of all
Scouts earn the Eagle rank - a testament to its high standards") [hereinafter
HANDBOOK]; see also Eagle Scouting, at http://bsa.scouting.org/factsheets/02-
516.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2001) ("The award is a performance-based
achievement whose standards have been well-maintained over the years... To
earn the Eagle Scout rank, the highest advancement rank in Scouting, a Boy
Scout must fulfill requirements in the areas of leadership, service, and outdoor
skills.").
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a member prior to turning eighteen. 5 7 He served in this capacity
for approximately sixteen months.'58
While attending Rutgers University, Dale acknowledged to
himself, his friends and his family that he was gay.15 He joined
the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance, 60  eventually
becoming the group's co-president.1 61 While attending a seminar
addressing the needs of gay and lesbian teenagers, Dale was
interviewed by a reporter for the New Jersey Star-Ledger.'62 On
July 8, 1990, an article appeared in the Star-Ledger that included
a photograph of Dale, with a caption identifying him as "co-
president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance."'
' 63
A few weeks after the article was published, Dale received a
letter from Monmouth Council Executive James W. Kay, instruct-
ing Dale to "sever any relations [he] may have with the Boy Scouts
of America."'' " Dale wrote a letter requesting the basis for the
Council's revocation of his membership.165 In response he re-
ceived another letter from Kay dated August 10, 1990, stating that
his membership revocation was grounded in "the standards for
leadership established by the Boy Scouts of America, which
specifically forbid membership to homosexuals."'
166
157 Dale 11, 734 A.2d. at 1204.
158 Id.
159 Id.
'60 See The BiGLARU: History, Aims and Goals, at http://mariner.rutgers.-
edulbiglaru/what.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2001) (describing the history of
Rutgers' Bisexual, Gay and Lesbian Alliance).
161 Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1204.
162 Id. at 1204-5.
163 Id. at 1204-5; see also Kinga Borondy, Seminar Addresses Needs of
Homosexual Teens, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), July 8, 1990, § 2, at 11.
'6' Dale 11, 734 A.2d at 1205. The letter also stated that Dale had sixty days
to request a review of his termination. Id.
165 Id. Dale's letter was dated Aug. 8, 1990. Id.
166 Id. As the Dale II court further noted:
Dale subsequently learned that in 1978 BSA had prepared a position
paper stating that "an individual who openly declares himself to be a
homosexual [may not] be a volunteer scout leader [or] ... a registered
unit member[.]" The position paper "was never distributed." Statements
were also written in 1991 and 1993 expressing similar positions. These
statements were written after the onset of litigation in other states
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Dale responded with a request to see a copy of the "standards
of leadership" referred to in Kay's second letter, and for the
opportunity to attend a hearing to challenge his membership
revocation. 67 After a second request for the standards went
unanswered,1 68 Dale received a notice that the Northeast Region
BSA Review Committee supported his membership revocation, and
that he would have thirty days to request a review with the
National Council Review Committee. 69 When Dale, through
counsel, requested the opportunity to attend a review of his
revocation before the National Committee,17 he was informed
that BSA "does not admit avowed homosexuals to membership in
the organization so no useful purpose would apparently be served
by having Mr. Dale present at the regional review meeting."'
' 71
In response, Dale filed a lawsuit against BSA, alleging that his
membership revocation was a violation of New Jersey's public
charging the organization with discrimination against members on the
basis of sexual orientation.
Id. at n.4. The "litigation in other states" involved Timothy Curran, another Eagle
Scout whose request for admission as an assistant scoutmaster was rejected "after
[Curran] publicly stated that he is a homosexual." Curran v. Mount Diablo
Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 952 P.2d 218, 219 (Cal. 1998). The
Curran complaint was first filed in 1980. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the
Boy Scouts of America, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 717 (Cal. App. Dep't 1983). The
California Court of Appeals held that Curran's case sufficiently stated a cause
of action under the Unruh Act, and thus the case was allowed to proceed. Id. at
734. At trial, the court determined that BSA was subject to the Unruh Act, but
that application of Unruh to BSA would infringe on BSA's First Amendment
freedom of association. Id. Curran's case was ultimately decided in 1998, when
the California Supreme Court held that BSA was not subject to the Unruh Act
as a place of public accommodation. Curran, 952 P.2d at 219.
167 Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1205.
168 Id. Dale's second notice was dated October 16, 1990. Id.
169 Id. This letter was sent on Nov. 27, 1990, by Charles Ball, the Assistant
Regional Director of the Northeast Region. Id.
70 Id. Dale's request was sent to the Chief Scout Executive of BSA, three
weeks after receiving Mr. Ball's Nov. 27 letter. Id.
'7' Id. at 1205.
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accommodation law, the LAD. 172 In relevant part, the LAD
provides:
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employ-
ment, and to obtain all the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of any place of public accommo-
dation, publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other
real property without discrimination because of race, creed,
color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, affec-
tional or sexual orientation, familial status, or sex, subject
only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all
persons. This opportunity is recognized as and declared to
be a civil right.
7 3
A. The Lower Court Decisions
The battle was first engaged in the chancery division of the
New Jersey courts, where Dale and BSA filed cross motions for
summary judgment. The court denied Dale's motion, but granted
BSA's,'74 finding that BSA had always maintained a policy of
excluding "active homosexual[s]" and that it was "unthinkable...
that the BSA could or would tolerate active homosexuality if
discovered in any of its members."'7 The court then found that
BSA was not a place of public accommodation, as BSA was
exempt under the LAD's "distinctly private" exception.
7 6
172 Id. Dale also alleged a common law cause of action. Because this article
focuses exclusively on the nature of public accommodation laws and their
interaction with First Amendment protections, the common law claim will not be
discussed.
173 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1999).
"' Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, No. MON-C-330-92 (N.J. Ch. Nov. 3,
1995).
1 Id. at 40. "The court opined that homosexual acts are immoral and
attributed to Boy Scouts a longstanding antipathy toward such behavior." Dale
H, 734 A.2d at 1206 (citing to the chancery division holding).
176 Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1206; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West
1999). "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to include or to apply to any
institution, bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature
distinctly private." Id.
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The New Jersey Appellate Division reversed.'77 In addition
to holding that BSA was a public accommodation under the LAD
and not exempt as a "distinctly private organization,"17 8 the court
found that BSA's First Amendment rights were not infringed upon
substantially enough to justify the "invidious discrimination" of
excluding gay SCOUtS. 179 The appellate court focused on the
relationship between BSA's "expressive purpose" and the exclusion
of gay scouts. 1 80 The court found that BSA's purpose - "to instill
in the scouts those qualities of leadership, courage and integrity to
which the BSA has traditionally adhered" - was not compromised
in "any significant way'"'8l by allowing the membership of
openly gay Scouts. 182 The court noted that nothing in the BSA
177 Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 706 A.2d 270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998) ("Dale Ill").
178 Id. at 283 ("[W]e reject summarily the trial judge's conclusion that
defendants qualified for the LAD exclusion ... for any 'institution which is in
its nature distinctly private."').
179 Id. at 288. "As applied to the facts before us, it cannot convincingly be
argued that the LAD's proscription against discrimination based on 'affectional
or sexual orientation' impedes the BSA's ability to express its collective views
on scouting." Id.
180 Id. at 288-90. "[It is undisputed that [an anti-gay] policy has not been
incorporated into BSA's bylaws, rules, regulations and handbooks. It was not
contained in plaintiff s application for the adult scoutmaster position." Id. at 290.
181 Id. "We conclude that enforcement of the LAD by granting plaintiff
access to the accommodations afforded by scouting will not affect in 'any
significant way' BSA's ability to express [its] views and to carry out [its]
activities." Id. at 288.
182 Id. It is interesting to note that, in its arguments before the appellate
division, BSA drew a distinction between Dale's participation before he publicly
acknowledged his homosexuality, and after. BSA's argument was that, upon this
public declaration, Dale undertook an "expressive activity," arguably to bring the
facts in this case more in line with Hurley. Id. at 292. Apparently, BSA has no
problem with the active participation of closeted gay scouts. The irony of this did
not go unnoticed by the appellate division: "In [the court's] view, there is a
patent inconsistency in the notion that a gay scout leader who keeps his 'secret'
hidden may remain in scouting and one who adheres to the scout laws by being
honest and courageous enough to declare his homosexuality publicly must be
expelled." Id. at 293. See generally Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and
Equality, 79 VA. L. REv. 1695, 1696 (1993) (analyzing the development of the
legal recognition of speech associated with homosexuality, and pointing out that
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"bylaws, rules, regulations and handbooks" indicated that its
expressive purpose was to exclude gay Scouts.
183
Finally, the court distinguished Hurley by interpreting that
decision as dealing exclusively with "a form of pure speech."'
' 84
The court explained:
Unlike a parade ... the BSA is a national organization
focusing its energy and resources on activities aimed at the
physical, moral and spiritual development of boys and
young men. [The LAD] simply demands access to those
activities; it does not attempt . . . to hamper BSA's ability
to carry out these activities or express its views respecting
their beliefs.
85
Further, the court recognized the distinction between Dale's desire
to join an organization, and GLIB's desire to speak - essentially,
to communicate the message that it was a gay Irish group.
86
B. The New Jersey Supreme Court: Rejecting Discrimi-
nation
The New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
appellate division's decision. 87 The court first considered wheth-
"[t]o be openly gay, when the closet is an option, is to function as an advocate
as well as a symbol").
' Dale III, 706 A.2d at 290-91. The court noted that two "position
statements" that BSA had relied upon as evidence that admitting gays was
violative of its expressive purpose were not adequately indicative of BSA's true
expressive purpose. "We cannot accept the proposition that [these] 'Position
Statement[s],' issued for the first time seventy-six years after Congress granted
the BSA its Charter, represents a collective 'expression' of ideals and beliefs that
brought the boy scouts together," especially since they were issued at "a time
when [BSA's] anti-gay policy was subject to judicial challenge in California."
Id. See also supra note 166 (detailing the "judicial challenge in California").
'8 Dale III, 706 A.2d at 292-93.
185 Id. at 293.
186 Id. Notably, the court acknowledged the nature of the distinction: "His
public acknowledgment that he is a homosexual is hardly comparable to a banner
in a parade declaring his pride in his homosexuality." Id.
187 Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1230 (N.J. 1999) ("Dale
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er BSA qualified as a public accommodation. 88 After analyzing
statutory interpretations of both "place" and "public accommoda-
tion," the court ultimately held BSA appropriately was subject to
the LAD as a place of public accommodation. 189 Further, the
court determined that BSA's claim that it should be exempt from
the LAD under the "distinctly private" exception was invalid.' 90
Accordingly, the court held that BSA's action of revoking Dale's
membership was in violation of the LAD: "It necessarily follows
that [BSA] violated the LAD when it expelled [James Dale]."' 9'
The court then faced the task of addressing BSA's First
Amendment claims. 92 Given the size of BSA, the intimate
association prong of the freedom of association was a fairly easy
assessment. "As applied to the Boy Scouts, we find that its large
size, nonselectivity, inclusive rather than exclusive purpose, and
practice of inviting or allowing nonmembers to attend meetings,
establish that the organization is not 'sufficiently personal or
private to warrant constitutional protection' under the freedom of
intimate association."'
193
The court began its expressive association analysis by stating
plainly that the "Boy Scout members do not associate for the
purpose of disseminating the belief that homosexuality is immoral,"
188 Id. at 1208. Because the goal of the LAD was "the eradication 'of the
cancer of discrimination,"' Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652 (1988) (quoting
Jackson v. Concord Co., 253 A.2d 793 (1969)), the court recognized that the
LAD should be "interpreted ... 'with that high degree of liberality which
comports with the preeminent social significance of its purposes and objects."'
Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1208 (quoting Andersen v. Exxon Co., 446 A.2d 486
(1982)).
189 Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1207-13.
'90 Id. at 1218. BSA also urged for exceptions under the "religious
educational facility" and "in loco parentis" exceptions. Id. at 1213. The court
disagreed with both rationales. Id. at 1218.
19" Id. at 1219. "It is undeniable that Dale lost those 'privileges' and
'advantages' [of BSA membership] when he was expelled." Id. at 1218.
192 Id. at 1219-29.
"' Id. at 1221. The court expressly held that this was true, regardless of
whether BSA argued as a national organization, or at the individual troop level.
Id. "[C]ontrary to Boy Scouts' assertion, whether we evaluate the Boy Scout
organization at the national or local troop level, the result would be the same."
Id.
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and thus, enforcement of the LAD "does not have a significant
impact on Boy Scout members' ability to associate with one
another in pursuit of shared views."'194 In fact, the court acknowl-
edged, BSA discourages its leaders from expressing any views on
sexual issues.1 95
The court acknowledged BSA's argument that the Scout Law
and Oath are evident of its views on homosexuality. 196 BSA had
argued that the language in these organizational mantras implied a
moral disapproval of homosexuality.'97 In particular, BSA relied
on the text of the "Clean" provision of the Scout Law 98 and the
194 Id. at 1223. "Boy Scouts discourages its leaders from disseminating any
views on sexual issues; and Boy Scouts includes sponsors and members who
subscribe to different views in respect of homosexuality." Id.
'9' Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1223.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 1224; see also Brief for Respondent at 32, Dale v. Boy Scouts of
America, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999) (No. A-2427-95T3) (arguing that "a Scout
leader who was an avowed homosexual would interfere with normative message
that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the Scout Oath and Law").
198 The full text of the Scout Law reads as follows: "A Scout is trustworthy,
loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean,
and reverent." HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 47. The Handbook also offers
detailed explanations of each term:
A Scout is trustworthy. A Scout tells the truth. He is honest, and he
keeps his promises. People can depend on him. ...
A Scout is loyal. A Scout is true to his family, friends, Scout leaders,
school, and nation....
A Scout is helpful. A Scout cares about other people. He willingly
volunteers to help others without expecting payment or reward....
A Scout is friendly. A Scout is a friend to all. He is a brother to other
Scouts. He offers his friendship to people of all races and nations, and
respects them even if their beliefs and customs are different from his
own....
A Scout is courteous. A Scout is polite to everyone regardless of age
or position. He knows that using good manners makes it easier for
people to get along ....
A Scout is kind. A Scout knows there is strength in being gentle. He
treats others as he wants to be treated. Without good reason, he does
not harm or kill any living thing....
A Scout is obedient. A Scout follows the rules of his family, school,
and troop. He obeys the laws of his community and country. If he
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"morally straight" reference in the Scout Oath 9 9 as indicative of
this condemnation of homosexuality. The court was clear in
rejecting these attempts at justifying Dale's exclusion: "The words
'morally straight' and 'clean' do not, on their face, express
anything about sexuality, much less that homosexuality, in
particular, is immoral. 2 °° Without more, the court found that it
was impossible to determine how Dale's inclusion could infringe
"in any significant way" on BSA's ability to carry out its various
thinks these rules and laws are unfair, he tries to have them changed
in an orderly manner rather than disobeying them....
A Scout is cheerful. A Scout looks for the bright side of life. He
cheerfully does tasks that come his way. He tries to make others
happy....
A Scout is thrifty. A Scout works to pay his way and to help others. He
saves for the future. He protects and conserves natural resources. He
carefully uses time and property....
A Scout is brave. A Scout can face danger although he is afraid. He
has the courage to stand for what he thinks is right even if others laugh
at him or threaten him....
A Scout is clean. A Scout keeps his body and mind fit. He chooses the
company of those who live by high standards. He helps keep his home
and community clean....
A Scout is reverent. A Scout is reverent toward God. He is faithful in
his religious duties. He respects the beliefs of others.
HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 47-54 (listing these provisions, and providing
even more detailed explication of each concept).
"' The full text of the Scout Oath reads as follows: "On my honor I will do
my best, To do my duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; To
help other people at all times; To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake,
and morally straight." HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 9. The Handbook also
describes the meaning of the Scout Oath, advising scouts, "Before you pledge
yourself to any oath or promise, you must know what it means." HANDBOOK,
supra note 156, at 45. Under the phrase, "and morally straight," the Handbook
provides the following:
To be a person of strong character, your relationships with others
should be honest and open. You should respect and defend the rights
of all people. Be clean in your speech and actions, and remain faithful
in your religious beliefs. The values you practice as a Scout will help
you shape a life of virtue and self-reliance.
HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 46.
2o0 Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1224.
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purposes.2"' Thus, Dale's exclusion was "based on assumptions
in respect of status" that are irrelevant to BSA's shared expressive
purpose.20 2 This type of exclusion, according to the court, was
rejected in Roberts and Rotary, and thus BSA's exclusion of Dale
was found to violate the LAD.20 3
Like the appellate division, the supreme court addressed BSA's
reliance on Hurley, this time in a sub-section entitled "Freedom of
Speech.,,2°4 Further, as the appellate division had, the court
swiftly rejected BSA's reliance: "We find the facts of Hurley
distinguishable. Dale's status as a scout leader is not equivalent to
a group marching in a parade., 20 5 Analyzing the facts as if it
were a free speech case, the court still determined that the factual
distinguishability from Hurley to Dale was sufficient to find BSA's
exclusion improper: "We reject the notion that Dale's presence in
the organization is symbolic of Boy Scouts' endorsement of
homosexuality."
20 6
The court ultimately held that New Jersey's compelling interest
to eliminate discrimination overcame BSA's claimed First Amend-
20 Id. at 1225 (citing Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,
548 (1987)). "That Boy Scout members do not associate to share the view that
homosexuality is immoral suggests that Dale's expulsion constituted discrimina-
tion based on his status as an openly gay man." Id.
202 id.
203 Id. The court then went on to describe the way in which Dale's exclusion
was an example of the very kind of discrimination the Supreme Court had
rejected in Roberts. "The invocation of stereotypes to justify discrimination is all
too familiar. Indeed, the story of discrimination is the story of stereotypes that
limit the potential of men, women, and children who belong to excluded groups."
Id. at 1226.
204 Id. at 1228-29.
205 Id. at 1229. The court further stated: "Dale has never used his leadership
position or membership to promote homosexuality, or any message inconsistent
with Boy Scouts' policies." Id. The court then analogized this to Curran v.
Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, where the plaintiff had
actively declared that he would use his membership "in order to promote" his
views about homosexuality. Id. (citing Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the
Boy Scouts of America, 952 P.2d 215, 253 (Cal. 1998) (Kennard, J., concur-
ring)).
206 Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1229.
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ment violation.2 °7 It acknowledged the unique place that BSA
holds as an "American institution committed to bringing a diverse
group of young boys and men together ... to play and learn. 2 °8
In the final analysis, however, nothing BSA presented "suggest[ed
to the court] that one of Boy Scouts' purposes is to promote the
view that homosexuality is immoral.,' '  Thus, BSA's First
Amendment claim was rejected.210
C. A Bare Majority of the United States Supreme Court
Rejects Anti-Discrimination, Ignores Precedent
The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed
the New Jersey Supreme Court.21 ' The majority decision was
207 Id. at 1228. The court described the nature of New Jersey's extensive
history in rejecting discrimination, noting that the LAD was enacted twenty years
before Title VII, the federal public accommodation statute. Id. at 1227. "Like
other similar statutes, the LAD serves a compelling state interest and 'abridges
no more speech or associational freedom than is necessary to accomplish that
purpose."' Id. at 1228 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 629).
208 Id. at 1228.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 1230. Judge Handler provided an extensive concurrence, where he
reiterated many of the same points from the majority opinion, although
advocating even more strongly that BSA's attempts to exclude Dale were
improper. See id. at 1230-45 (Handler, J., concurring).
I fully endorse the Court's reasoning in reaching [its] result.... This
case... pits an individual's right to be protected under the LAD from
discrimination based on his sexual orientation against the First
Amendment expressional rights of a public accommodation. In
resolving that conflict, we must consider the significance of the
connection between the individual's speech and his identity when both
relate to his sexual orientation.
Id. Judge Handler then went on to argue passionately for the end to discrimina-
tion against gays and lesbians. "Stereotypes cannot be invoked to extend the
meaning of self-identifying expression of one's own sexual orientation, and
thereby become a vehicle for discrimination against homosexuals." Id. at 1245.
2. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2449 (2000). The Court
split along traditional conservative-liberal lines, with Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas joining Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority decision. Id.
There was much speculation about how the Court would resolve the case when
it was argued. Many predicted the eventual outcome, speculating that ideological
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terse, and contained many logical leaps that resolved few of the
questions raised by Hurley.212 Still, the Court made clear that,
precedent aside, it would not be the institutional body responsible
for telling the Boy Scouts that it could not reject an "avowed
homosexual" and "gay activist."2"3
After detailing the procedural history of the case, the Court
began its discussion of the law by recounting Roberts."4 In its
articulation of the parameters of the right to exclude, however, the
Court left out a key aspect of the law as set out in Roberts and
injected something new. 21 '5 The Roberts Court stated the relevant
law as: "a regulation that forces the group to accept members it
does not desire ... may impair the ability of the original members
to express only those views that brought them together.' ' 21 6 The
Dale Court, on the other hand, stated: "[f]orcing a group to accept
certain members may impair the ability of the group to express
those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.217
predispositions would dictate the decision. See Tony Mauro, Justices Poised to
Overturn Ruling that Forced Scouts to Admit Gays, N.J. L.J., May 1, 2000, at
4; Gay Rights, Boy Scouts, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2000, at A30. Still, when the
case was argued on April 26, 2000, the lively questioning on both sides of the
ideologic divide left many wondering at the possibility of a different outcome.
See Roger K. Lowe, Scout Case Perplexes High Court, COL. DISPATCH, Apr. 30,
2000, at C3; Deb Price, Will Justices' Scrutiny Help Gay Scouts?, DETROIT
NEWS, May 1, 2000, at 11; Rocco Cammarere, Court Twists Over Scouts' Knot
on Gays, N.J. LAW., May 1, 2000, at 1; Editorial, Trustworthy, Loyal, Helpful
- and Gay?, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2000, at A22; see also Oral Argument, Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
212 See, e.g., Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere, supra note 2, at 12
("The text is fairly terse ... That terseness produces both an easy road map to
the Court's logic, and elisions and logical lapses at critical points."); see also
Andrea R. Scott, Casenote, State Public Accommodation Laws, the Freedom of
Expressive Association, and the Inadequacy of the Balancing Test Utilized in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 24 HAMLINE L. REv. 131, 159
(2000) (noting that, because of the Court's analysis of Hurley, "[t]he Dale Court
has blurred the distinction between free speech and expressive association" law).
213 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449.
214 Id. at 2451.
215 See supra Part I.C. 1 (detailing Roberts).
216 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (emphasis added).
217 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451 (emphasis added).
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The Dale Court articulated the law in a fundamentally different
way than the Roberts Court had. It changed the emphasis from that
aspect of the association that brought the group together, to that
aspect of association about which the group intends to express.
Nowhere, however, does the Court connect this newly formed
articulation of association law with the principles underlying the
constitutional right.
After recognizing that BSA is, in fact, an organization with an
expressive purpose,218 the Court looked to what extent Dale's
inclusion would "significantly affect" BSA's "ability to advocate
public or private viewpoints. '219 Here again, the Court changed
the law. The Roberts Court had posed the question, does the forced
inclusion "impose[] any serious burdens on the [organization's]
freedom of expressive association"?220 The Roberts analysis
focused on the extent to which an organization's expressive
association is burdened because that furthers the underlying
principle behind freedom of association law - that the First
Amendment should protect the expressive element "that brought
them together., 221 The Dale Court's focus on the notion of
"advocating viewpoints" repositioned the law of freedom of
association as outlined in Roberts. In essence, the Court Hurley-
ized the Roberts trilogy.
The Court then determined that the New Jersey Supreme Court
was wrong first to review BSA's expressive purpose by looking at
the record objectively, and then to consider the burden on BSA by
Dale's forced inclusion.222 "[O1ur cases reject this sort of inquiry;
it is not the role of the courts to reject a group's expressed values
because they disagree with those values or find them internally
inconsistent., 223 Instead, the Court noted that it was appropriate
to "accept the Boy Scouts' assertion" that they do not want "to
218 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451-52.
219 Id. at 2452 (emphasis added).
22Q Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626 (emphasis added).
221 Id. at 623.
222 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2452.
223 id.
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promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behav-
ior." '224 In fact, the Court took the stridency with which BSA had
maintained its opposition to homosexuality in various court battles
as evidence of its true position.2 5
The Court's next move was another serious detour from the
Roberts doctrine, and likely changed its future effects. Where the
Roberts Court looked intently at the extent to which the forced
inclusion would create "serious burdens" on the Jaycees' rights of
expressive association,226 the Dale Court chose instead to "give
deference to an association's view of what would impair its
expression., 227 This change in posture resulted in the Court
accepting BSA's reliance on Hurley as to how Dale's presence
would "impair its message. 228
224 Id. at 2453. "We need not inquire further to determine the nature of the
Boy Scouts' expression with respect to homosexuality." Id. On this point, the
Court did not veer from the Roberts analysis, as the Roberts Court did not need
to assess whether or not the Jaycees did in fact disapprove of women as
members. Thus, it is a new part of the equation that an organization can profess
the scope of its expressive purpose. What this analysis ignores, however, is the
essence of Roberts. See supra Part L.C (analyzing how the Roberts trilogy stands
for the rejection of "invidious discrimination").
12 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453 ("We cannot doubt that the Boy Scouts sincerely
holds this view.").
226 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
227 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453. As support for this bold new reading of a
court's obligation after Roberts, the Dale majority cited to Democratic Party of
United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1981). La
Follette involved the selection of delegates for a state Democratic Party. That
Court determined that it could not interject its own reasoning into the process
used to select delegates. Id. The case predated Roberts; in fact, the Roberts Court
cited to La Follette in a "Cf." citation, apparently believing its principles
suupported the method of analysis undertaken in Roberts. Roberts, 468 U.S. at
627. Certainly, La Follette does not stand for giving total deference to a litigant
over the very core of the issue before the Court. Nonetheless, the Dale majority's
reliance on La Follette "re-characterizes" its holding as now justifying a type of
Court deference completely at odds with the essence of the Roberts decision.
228 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454. "Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at
the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth
members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior." Id. The Court then quoted extensively from Hurley,
describing how the imposition of GLIB' s message into the parade would "force"
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The Court then reinterpreted First Amendment law to justify
this misinterpretation of and reliance on Hurley, asserting a new
definition of the right of expressive association. "First, associations
do not associate for the 'purpose' of disseminating a certain
message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First
Amendment., 229 Discussing Hurley, the Court claimed that the
parade organizers did not need to assert something about sexual
orientation in order to receive First Amendment protection.23 ° In
making this assertion, however, the Court failed to recognize the
distinction between the nature of the speech protected in Hurley
and the expressive association issue at stake in Dale.z3'
The Court next reiterated its assertion that BSA's "sincerity of
belief' was sufficient for it to extend First Amendment protection,
despite New Jersey's compelling interest to the contrary.232
Further, the Court held that it did not matter that there were
varying opinions within BSA on the issue of homosexuality.
Because BSA takes an "official position with respect to homosexu-
al conduct," the fact that some in the organization disagree was
irrelevant.233
GLIB's message onto the parade organizers, therein violating the First Amend-
ment. Id. Then, to complete its conflation of Hurley's quote about parades and
banners, the Court explained:
As the presence of GLIB in Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade would
have interfered with the parade organizers' choice not to propound a
particular point of view, the presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmas-
ter would just as surely interfere with the Boy Scout's choice not to
propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.
Id.
229 Id. at 2454.
230 Id.
231 See infra Part III.A (discussing how the Dale majority conflated status
and viewpoint).
232 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454-55.
233 Id. at 2455. "The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to
send one message but not the other. The fact that the organization does not
trumpet its views from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks,
does not mean that its views receive no First Amendment protection." Id. This
section of the Court's argument, of course, depends on the conflation caused by
the introduction of the Hurley analogy. The continuous references to "homosexu-
al behavior" and the fact that Dale was an "avowed homosexual" and "gay rights
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The majority then faulted New Jersey's public accommodation
law, and the New Jersey Supreme Court's application thereof.
While the Court was constrained to accept New Jersey's expansive
interpretation of the statute, it noted that "the New Jersey Supreme
Court went a step further and applied its public accommodations
laws to a private entity without even attempting to tie the term
'place' to a physical location." '34 Finally, the Court concluded
that requiring BSA to retain Dale "would significantly burden the
organization's right to oppose or disfavor homosexual con-
duct., 235 Thus, the Court rejected Dale's claim, and affirmed
BSA's right to discriminate against gay men.236
There were two dissents; the principle one, authored by Justice
Stevens,237 took a very similar approach to that taken by the New
Jersey Supreme Court. Justice Stevens first expressed dismay that
the majority relied so heavily on BSA's "official statements" to
justify its belief that the organization was opposed to "homosexual-
ity. 2 38 The dissent also lamented the fact that the majority's
activist" are evidence that the Court did not want to address the more difficult
issue - whether Dale's status as a gay man, in and of itself, was the equivalent
of GLIB's banner, causing Dale's mere presence to impart onto BSA a message
that "being gay" is moral. See infra Part III.A.
214 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2456. In fact, the Court noted in a footnote, the New
Jersey court was the only state supreme court in the country to interpret a public
accommodation law so broadly. Id. at n.3.
235 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2457.
236 Id. "That being the case, we hold that the First Amendment prohibits the
State from imposing such a requirement through the application of its public
accommodations law." id.
237 Id. at 2459. Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined Justice Stevens'
dissent. Id. at 2449.
238 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2459 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted
that the policies were insufficient to justify Dale's exclusion. "[S]imply adopting
such a policy has never been considered sufficient, by itself, to prevail on a right
to associate claim." Id. at 2463. The policy, furthermore, "was never publicly
expressed." Id. Additionally, the first known policy statement, from 1978, was
equivocal at best, because it stated that a person who "openly declares himself
to be a homosexual" could not be a scoutmaster "in the absence of any law to
the contrary." Id. Since the LAD was a law "to the contrary," Justice Stevens
argued, it was not unequivocal that the statement would still support Dale's
exclusion. Id. Finally, Justice Stevens noted that the policy only expressed that
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handling of the Dale facts rejected First Amendment precedent.239
"[U]ntil today, we have never once found a claimed right to
associate in the selection of members to prevail in the face of a
State's antidiscrimination law., 240 After recounting the history of
the Roberts trilogy, Justice Stevens summed up:
Several principles are made perfectly clear by Jaycees and
Rotary Club. First, to prevail on a claim of expressive
association in the face of a State's antidiscrimination law,
it is not enough simply to engage in some kind of expres-
sive activity. Both the Jaycees and the Rotary Club
engaged in expressive activity protected by the First
Amendment, yet that fact was not dispositive. Second, it is
not enough to adopt an openly avowed exclusionary
membership policy. Both the Jaycees and the Rotary Club
did that as well. Third, it is not sufficient merely to
articulate some connection between the group's expressive
activities and its exclusionary policy.
241
Justice Stevens was most concerned about the impact of the
majority's analysis on future precedent, and about the way the
majority altered the scope of freedom of association law. "I am
unaware of any previous instance in which our analysis of the
scope of a constitutional right was determined by looking at what
a litigant asserts in his or her brief and inquiring no further.,
242
Justice Stevens' dissent ended by lamenting the unfair stereo-
typing of gays and lesbians, and the way those "atavistic opinions"
die out through "interaction with real people, rather than mere
adherence to traditional ways of thinking about members of
unfamiliar classes. 243
homosexuality was "not 'appropriate."' Id.
239 Id. at 2466.
240 Id. at 2467. "To the contrary, we have squarely held that a State's
antidiscrimination law does not violate a group's right to associate simply
because the law conflicts with that group's exclusionary membership policy." Id.
241 Id. at 2468-69 (emphasis in original). "The majority pretermits this entire
analysis." Id. at 2470.
242 Id. at 2471.
243 Id. at 2477-78. Justice Souter added a short dissent, joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer. Id. at 2478-79 (Souter, J., dissenting). Although agreeing
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EXCLUDE GAY MEN
The nature of the disagreement between the Dale Court's
majority and dissent lies in the conceptualization of the constitu-
tional right in question: the majority saw the issue as one about
speech, and thus credited the illustration provided by Hurley, and
its hallowed assertion that speech forced on someone is a violation
of the right not to speak. 2" Few would reject that; few endorse
the idea that it is all right for a government to require an organiza-
tion to say something with which it disagrees. But, as the dissent
articulated in its conceptualization of the right at issue, this ignores
the history and essence of the freedom of association jurisprudence,
dating back to NAACP v. Alabama,245 and through its classic
articulation in the Roberts trilogy.246 At the core of these cases
is the kernel of truth so obviously ignored by the majority: that a
group can only rely on the First Amendment's protection to the
extent that the message in jeopardy is at the core of the group's
expressive purpose.24 7 In failing to deny BSA its right to hide its
invidious discrimination behind the First Amendment, the Dale
majority created the constitutional right to exclude gay men.
2 48
with all of Justice Stevens' dissent, Justice Souter wanted to make clear that the
change in society's perceptions about gays and lesbians were relevant, but not
a requirement for the dissent's assessment of the decision. Id. Rather, Justice
Souter argued that it was essential that BSA's "failure to make sexual orientation
the subject of any unequivocal advocacy" that required his decision that they
should not be afforded First Amendment protection. Id. at 2479. "To require less,
and to allow exemption from a public accommodations statute based on any
individual's difference from an alleged group ideal, however expressed and
however inconsistently claimed, would convert the right of expressive association
into an easy trump of any antidiscrimination law." Id.
244 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454. "Hurley is illustrative on this point." Id.
245 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
246 See NY Clubs, 487 U.S. at 1; Rotary, 481 U.S. at 537; Roberts, 468 U.S.
at 609; see also supra, Part I.C (documenting the history of the United States
Supreme Court's development of the freedom of association).
247 See infra Part III.B.1 (articulating the rationale behind the First
Amendment freedom of association).
248 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2478 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Hunter,
Accommodating the Public Sphere, supra note 2, at 24 ("[T]he result is that
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The Dale majority's failure is twofold. First, the Court accepted
BSA's argument that Hurley was applicable on the question of
whether Dale's inclusion would necessarily require BSA to take on
the viewpoint that homosexual conduct is not immoral. 249 More-
over, the Dale Court simply misapplied precedent - ignoring the
very limited nature of the freedom of association, and denying the
applicability of the discrimination rejected in the Roberts trilo-
gyO
250
A. Even Crediting the Majority's Invocation of Hurley, Dale
Still Got It Wrong
Hurley's unique procedural history went a long way toward
confusing the freedom of association jurisprudence.251 It did deal
with a public accommodation statute,252 however, and the plain-
tiffs did raise a freedom of expressive association argument;
25 3
socially visible homosexuality creates a basis for exclusion to an extent that no
other minority characteristic does."). The right to exclude gay men and lesbians
already exists in another context, actually: the military's "don't ask, don't tell"
policy was deemed constitutional. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628,
636 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy
"does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution").
The Dale decision, on the other hand, deals specifically with gay men, as BSA
is a male-only organization, and thus the exclusion relates only to gay men.
Arguably, its principles would apply if an all-women's organization sought to
exclude lesbians from its membership. Professor Hunter notes, however, that the
majority's analysis "invokes another canard: the intrinsic uncontrollability of gay
male sexuality." Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere, supra note 2, at 22.
It is conceivable that an effort to exclude a lesbian would result in a different
outcome, because the spectre of "gay male sexuality" would presumably not
apply to lesbians.
249 See infra Part III.A.
250 See infra Part III.B.
251 See supra Part I.C.4 (discussing the fact that Hurley was originally
analyzed under a freedom of expressive association claim, but ultimately decided
by the Supreme Court using a freedom of speech analysis).
252 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561 (citing section 272:98 of the Massachusetts
General Laws, the state's public accommodation statute).
253 Id. at 563 (noting that the trial court rejected the defendants' claims that
the forced inclusion of GLIB would negatively implicate their associational
rights).
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thus, its place in this area of law is not without some rationale.
Ultimately, though, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case on pure speech grounds.254 What the Dale majority does by
invoking Hurley within the context of Dale's freedom of associa-
tion analysis is fail to clarify this confusion.2 5 Instead, the Court
used aspects of the Hurley analysis to change the Roberts trilogy's
effect. First, it discredited the specificity of Hurley's holding -
which was about the unique nature of parades and banners. 6 In
the process, the Court muddied First Amendment jurisprudence
separating free speech and freedom of expressive association
analyses. 7 Finally, in the process of transposing onto James
Dale the essence of "sending a message," the Dale majority
conflated status and speech, 258 evidencing the Court's ignorance
254 Id. at 581 ("Our holding today rests not on any particular view about the
Council's message but on the Nation's commitment to protect freedom of
speech."); see also Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1229 (arguing that the Dale facts are
distinguishable from Hurley's because that case was decided on freedom of
speech grounds).
255 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454. This invocation immediately followed Chief
Justice Rehnquist's application of a traditionally free speech-type analysis:
"Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organiza-
tion to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy
Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior." Id.
256 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568-70 (detailing the expressive nature of a parade
as a threshold analysis in determining whether the parade organizers were
justified in rejecting certain members from participating in the parade); see also
Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Our conclusion [in Hurley]
that GLIB was conveying a message was inextricably tied to the fact that GLIB
wanted to march in a parade, as well as the manner in which it intended to
march.").
257 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2472 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Though the
majority mistakenly treats this statement as going to the right to associate, it
actually refers to a free speech claim.").
258 Id. at 2476 ("Under the majority's reasoning, an openly gay male is
irreversibly affixed with the label 'homosexual.' That label, even though unseen,
communicates a message that permits his exclusion wherever he goes.").
Remarkably, Judge Nolan's dissent in Hurley by the SJC, which first made the
free speech argument in the Hurley case, did not mistake this principle. See
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 565 ("In Justice Nolan's opinion, because GLIB's message
was separable from the status of its members ... a narrower order [allowing
individuals to march without a banner] would accommodate the State's interest
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to emerging conceptions of gay and lesbian identity, and sexuality
in general. 9
1. Hurley Was About Parades and Banners
Justice Souter's first words in Hurley broadcast the intent of the
ultimate holding: "The issue in this case is whether Massachusetts
may require private citizens who organize a parade to include
among the marchers a group imparting a message the organizers do
not wish to convey., 260 The Court took great pains to define the
nature of a parade, to establish its expressive elements, and to
explain why the case was so obvious to the unanimous Court.
2 61
The Court drew parallels from free speech jurisprudence to firmly
root the decision among that line of cases.262 It made all of this
without likelihood of infringing on the Council's First Amendment Rights."); see
also infra Part III.A.2.
259 See Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for
Equality, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2000) (discussing coming out
speech for gays and lesbians as a form of "expressive identity").
Expressive identity is a product of identity politics, an outgrowth of a
series of equality claims. These claims are made, often by and through
law, not on behalf of a voluntarist group that expresses an ideology,
but on behalf of a group defined by an identity which is itself
expressive. A new equality discourse has shifted from understanding
race and other characteristics as simply inborn fortuities to seeing them
as socialized meanings of communities and groups. The law has played
a central, fundamental role in shaping the new meanings of identity.
Id.
260 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559 (emphasis added).
261 See id. at 569 ("Not many marches, then, are beyond the realm of
expressive parades, and the South Boston celebration is not one of them."). Since
parades are a form of speech, the Court held, using a state public accommodation
law to force GLIB's participation "violates the fundamental rule of protection
under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message." Id. at 573.
262 Id. at 569.
Cable operators, for example, are engaged in protected speech activities
even when they only select programming originally produced by
others.... [and] the presentation of an edited compilation of speech
generated by other persons is a staple of most newspapers' opinion
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clear so that its decision could be understood to reject the lower
courts' freedom of association analyses, and explicitly establish that
"a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own
message. 263 Thus, Hurley can and should be read narrowly as
interpreting free speech rights, specifically in the context of a
parade.26
An especially important fact about Hurley was that the parade
organizers claimed that they did not find it objectionable to allow
individual gay marchers into the parade; rather, they claimed that
the marchers walking behind a banner, proclaiming their homosex-
uality, was objectionable. 265 The organizers "disclaim[ed] any
intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and no individual member
of GLIB claim[ed] to have been excluded from parading as a
member of any group that the Council [had] approved to
march. 266 It was of no concern that they alone, as gay people,
would send any "articulable message" that would be projected onto
the parade organizers.267 What was of concern was that GLIB,
marching as a group and carrying a banner, would communicate a
message that the Hurley Court found to be a violation of the
pages, which, of course, fall squarely within the core of First Amend-
ment security.
Id. at 570 (citations omitted). The Court even made references to the protection
of works of art which are without question forms of speech protected by the First
Amendment. "[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a
'particularized message,' ... would never reach the unquestionably shielded
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse
of Lewis Carroll." Id. at 569 (citations omitted). See also supra Part I.C.4
(discussing the Court's holding and rationale in Hurley).
263 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
264 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2474-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing how
Hurley's holding was specific to the fact that it was about parades, and that it
interpreted the right of free speech, not freedom of association).
265 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572.
266 Id.
267 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, we
expressly distinguished between the members of GLIB, who marched as a unit
to express their views about their own sexual orientation, on the one hand, and
homosexuals who might participate as individuals in the parade without intending
to express anything about their sexuality by doing so.").
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organizers' freedom of speech; a violation of their right to not say
something.268 It is clear from the facts and holding of Hurley that
gay individuals do not, in their status as gay individuals, sufficient-
ly proclaim anything in violation of Hurley's mandate.269
The Dale majority plainly missed this distinction. Instead,
without further explanation, the Court, juxtaposing its argument
with Hurley,27° stated:
As the presence of GLIB in Boston's St. Patrick's Day
parade would have interfered with the parade organizers'
choice not to propound a particular point of view, the
presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as
surely interfere with the Boy Scout's choice not to pro-
pound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.27'
The majority ignored the factual distinction in Hurley, and
imported the essence of its principles into Dale, without reason or
explanation. 72
To understand what would truly be comparable, consider a fact
pattern in a Boy Scout scenario that might have been similar,
therein justifying Chief Justice Rehnquist's elision. Suppose James
Dale proposed the formation of a BSA chapter, and sought official
recognition from the National Committee. This scenario would
268 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573 ("Indeed [the] general rule, that the speaker has
the right to tailor the speech, applies not only to expressions of value, opinion,
or endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather
avoid.").
269 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Dale's inclusion in the
Boy Scouts is nothing like the case in Hurley. His participation sends no
cognizable message to the Scouts or to the world.").
270 Bizarrely, the Court even referenced the point that the parade organizers
were concerned not with the individual gay people marching, but rather the group
marching behind a banner. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454. The Court then took the text
from Hurley - "it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a
particular point of view" - and applied it not to the imposition created by the
group and their banner, but on the individual, without explaining the rationale
underlying this significant leap. Id. (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575).
271 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454.
272 Id. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Though Hurley has a superficial
similarity to the present case, a close inspection reveals a wide gulf between that
case and the one before us today." Id.
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make Hurley factually comparable; this scenario alone creates the
kind of problematic request that would justify Hurley's applicabili-
ty. If a court were faced with these facts, and the question
presented was whether it was proper for a state law to require BSA
to recognize this group, Hurley's principles would be relevant. For
in that case, and not in Dale, the state law would require BSA to
officially recognize, and therein take on the message of, a group
propounding "a point of view contrary to its beliefs." '273
2. Why Complicate the Roberts Test with a
Free Speech-type Analysis?
As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated clearly in response to
BSA's argument that Hurley was dispositive, "[w]e find the facts
of Hurley distinguishable. '274 Hurley's analysis, however, incor-
porated both freedom of speech and freedom of association
analyses, which created the opportunity for BSA to argue for its
application in Dale. By refusing to state definitively that Hurley's
analysis is exclusive to free speech claims, the Dale Court
unnecessarily interjected free speech-type analysis into the Roberts
paradigm. Lower courts will be faced with a quandary: with facts
similar to Dale, yet also similar to Roberts, which case should they
follow? The quandary lies in the distinction between the two
approaches.
In the freedom of speech context, when a party wants to limit
the scope of its speech, it is very difficult for government to find
any justification for forcing that private party to take on someone
else's speech.275 This is the essence of free speech, and the
273 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575.
274 Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1229. The court made this determination during its
analysis under the heading, "Freedom of Speech." Id. at 1228.
275 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
Although the State may at times "prescribe what shall be orthodox in
commercial advertising" ... outside that context it may not compel
affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees. Indeed this
general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies
not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally
to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid, subject, perhaps,
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correlative right not to speak; it is a First Amendment right distinct
from a freedom of association claim.276 The courts have deter-
mined that a newspaper 77 and a cable operator27 s engage in
protected forms of speech, and each has the right to determine its
own speech completely.27 9 Likewise, they as entities have the
freedom to say what they choose - the affirmative right of free
speech.
In contrast, within the freedom of expressive association
context, when a party seeks to exclude someone, the court must
determine the organization's expressive purpose in order to
determine whether the excluded member's presence would
seriously burden that purpose.280 The question at the heart of the
analysis is not what speech will be forced on the organization for
taking on a new member. The focus is on the extent to which the
potentially excluded member's status would impinge on that
group's ability to fulfill its expressive purpose.281 In Roberts, the
to the permissive law of defamation.
Id. (citations omitted).
276 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The standards
governing [a free speech] claim are simply different from the standards that
govern BSA's claim of a right of expressive association.").
277 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Turnillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
278 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
279 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Generally, a private
person or a private organization has a right to refuse to broadcast a message with
which it disagrees, and a right to refuse to contradict or garble its own specific
statement at any given place or time by including the messages of others.").
280 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27 (analyzing the types of activities
undertaken by the Jaycees to determine whether the organization's expressive
purpose would be burdened by the inclusion of women); see also Dale, 120 S.
Ct. at 2469 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Iln Jaycees, we asked whether Minneso-
ta's Human Rights Law requiring the admission of women 'impose[d] any
serious burdens' on the group's 'collective effort on behalf of [its] shared
goals."') (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27) (emphasis in original).
281 See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627 ("There is ... no basis in the record
for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the
organization's ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its
preferred views."); see also Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("An expressive association claim, however, normally involves the avowal and
advocacy of a consistent position on some issue over time."); id. at 2479 (Souter,
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Court did not ask the question, "what speech will including women
in the Jaycees force on the organization?". Rather, it asked to what
extent the Jaycees' expressive purpose would be compromised by
women's inclusion.282 Thus, as Justice Stevens articulated in the
Dale dissent, "a different kind of scrutiny must be given to an
expressive association claim., 283 The essence of the right -
safeguarding the freedom of the speech or viewpoint of the group
- is protected. The constitutional right, however, does not become
a shield behind which certain members of an organization's
leadership can hide their "invidious discrimination. 284
The First Amendment speech rights are relevant, obviously, but
only to the extent that the organization's group activities/speech are
implicated.2 85 In Hurley, the parade organizers' freedom of
association was not compromised; their freedom of speech was.286
J., dissenting) ("I conclude that BSA has not made out an expressive association
claim ... not because of what BSA may espouse, but because of its failure to
make sexual orientation the subject of any unequivocal advocacy, using the
channels it customarily employs to state its message."); see also Part I.C.1-4
(detailing the development of the Roberts trilogy).
282 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627 (pointing out that "any claim that admission of
women as full voting members will impair a symbolic message conveyed by the
very fact that women are not permitted to vote is attenuated at best").
283 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
284 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 ("As we have explained, acts of invidious
discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other
advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest to
prevent - wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit.").
Justice Stevens underscored the rationale for this reasoning:
[A] different kind of scrutiny must be given to an expressive associa-
tion claim, lest the right of expressive association simply tum into a
right to discriminate whenever some group can think of an expressive
object that would seem to be inconsistent with the admission of some
person as a member or at odds with the appointment of a person to a
leadership position in the group.
Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
285 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2469 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
286 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 ("Petitioners' claim to the benefit of this
principle of autonomy to control one's own speech is as sound as the South
Boston parade is expressive.") (emphasis added).
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Likewise, BSA's freedom of speech was not compromised by
Dale. 287 BSA's true claim was whether its freedom of association
was compromised. 28 8 Asking the question - "what speech is he
forcing on us?" - is not the proper approach, then, to the constitu-
tional question raised in a freedom of association case.289
3. The First Amendment Prohibits Forced
Viewpoint/Speech - Not Status
BSA's continued assertion throughout the Dale litigation that
Hurley was controlling depended on the fact that Dale's forced
membership required the organization to "propound" some speech
or viewpoint.29 Prior freedom of association caselaw did not use
287 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Dale's inclusion in the
Boy Scouts is nothing like the case in Hurley. His participation sends no
cognizable message to the Scouts or to the world.").
288 In its brief to the Supreme Court, in fact, BSA argued that both its free
speech and its free association rights were compromised. See Brief for Petitioner
at i, Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (No. 99-699). The question presented read: "Whether
a state law requiring a Boy Scout Troop to appoint an avowed homosexual and
gay rights activist as an Assistant Scoutmaster responsible for communicating
Boy Scouting's moral values to youth members abridges First Amendment rights
of freedom of speech and freedom of association." Id.
289 Arguably, even if that question were proper in the freedom of association
cases, BSA should still lose. As the Court articulated in Hurley, one reason that
GLIB's speech was imposed on the parade organizers in Hurley was because
there was no opportunity for Hurley to disclaim its contents, given the unique
nature of the parade. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576-77 ("Practice follows practicability
here, for such disclaimers would be quite curious in a moving parade."). "A
membership organization, by contrast, has multiple methods easily available for
making its own views clear." Brief for the Society of American Law Teachers
at 10, Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (No. 99-699). Where an organization has the ability
to "disclaim" the message, the Court has said, it will not be considered speech
imposed on that establishment. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74, 87 (1980) ("[A]ppellants can expressly disavow any connection with the
message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers
stand.").
290 See Brief for Petitioner at 19, Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (No. 99-699).
[T]he New Jersey Supreme Court's decision that a Boy Scout Troop
must appoint an open homosexual and gay rights activist as Assistant
Scoutmaster violates Scouting's freedom of speech. An organization
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the language of "viewpoints" "forced on" organizations; rather, it
focused on whether the nature of the exclusion could be seen to
impose any "serious burdens" on the group's ability to associate
around that group's "shared goals. 29' When BSA's attorneys
argued that Hurley was dispositive, they sought to convince the
courts that the LAD's application to Dale would produce the same
kind of "forced speech" that was at the heart of Hurley.292 Unfor-
tunately, they were successful.293
Public accommodation laws do not prohibit viewpoint discrimi-
nation - they prohibit discrimination on the basis of status.294 The
exact language of the statute at the heart of Dale reads:
cannot speak except through its agents. The adult Troop leader is the
embodiment of the ideals of Boy Scouting. In light of the roles of
uniformed adult leaders and their symbolic position in Scouting, to
force Scouting to appoint persons who intend to be "open" and
"honest" about their homosexuality ... would violate the organiza-
tion's right to control its own message and to avoid association with
a message with which it does not agree. On this point, this case is
controlled by the Court's recent, unanimous decision in Hurley.
Id. (citations ommitted).
291 See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27.
292 See Brief for Petitioner at 23-24, Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (No. 99-699).
To the extent that there are any differences between this case and
Hurley, this case presents an even stronger case for constitutional
protection.... Just as including the GLIB group in the St. Patrick's
Day parade would "violate[] the fundamental rule of protection under
the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message," putting Dale in an adult leader's uniform
would interfere with Boy Scouting's ability to control the content of
its message. Indeed, the very service of an openly gay person as a role
model would convey a message with which Boy Scouting does not
wish to be associated.
Id. (citations omitted).
293 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454 (discussing how Hurley is "illustrative" in
understanding how Dale's membership would implicate BSA's message).
294 See Brief for the Society of American Law Teachers at 8-9, Dale, 120
S. Ct. 2446 (No. 99-699) ("Indeed, this case would not be here had Dale been
expelled for his views. The LAD does not prohibit the Boy Scouts from
excluding persons for expressing points of view contrary to the Scouts'
philosophy.").
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All persons shall have the opportunity. . . to obtain all the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of
any place of public accommodation ... without discrmi-
nation because of race, creed, color, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orienta-
tion.295
The law prohibits discrimination based on someone's status - not
a viewpoint that individual's status signifies.296 Other public
accommodation laws are similar,297 including those at issue in
Roberts298 and Rotary.29 9 In each of those cases, the Court rec-
ognized that it was the status of women that precipitated their
exclusion.3"' If the Court had undertaken the same analysis in
Roberts as it did in Dale - and interjected the Hurley "viewpoint"
analysis - it is likely it would have rejected the same idea: that
women, by their status as females, inherently would project some
message onto the Jaycees.3 '
The key to BSA's success was convincing the Court that there
was something unique about an "avowed homosexual, 30 2 and
295 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1999).
296 See NY Clubs, 487 U.S. at 13.
If a club seeks to exclude individuals who do not share the views that
the club's members wish to promote, the Law erects no obstacle to this
end. Instead, the Law merely prevents an association from using race,
sex, and the other specified characteristics as shorthand measures in
place of what the city considers to be more legitimate criteria for
determining membership.
Id.; see also Brief for the Society of American Law Teachers at 8-9, Dale, 120
S. Ct. 2446 (No. 99-699) (pointing out that the LAD "only prohibits [BSA] from
excluding persons because of their 'race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry,
age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation,' i.e., because of their status")
(quoting from N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4).
297 See supra Part L.A (detailing the history of public accommodation laws).
298 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(3) (West 1999).
299 CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 51 (West 2000).
'0o Rotary, 481 U.S. at 544; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
30 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627 ("[A]ny claim that admission of women as
full voting members will impair a symbolic message conveyed by the very fact
that women are not permitted to vote is attenuated at best.").
302 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449; see also Brief for the Society of American Law
Teachers at 9, Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (No. 99-699) ("The Boy Scouts seek to
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"gay rights activist., 313 The idea, BSA argued, was that a gay
man's status was so imbued with elements of speech that the
acknowledged participation of a gay man within scouting would
raise the specter that BSA condoned homosexuality. 304 Nowhere
in its supporting materials does BSA sufficiently show that James
Dale ever intended to use his role as a scoutmaster to assert the
idea that BSA's position on homosexuality was improper.3 °5 This
is especially disingenuous because BSA itself asserts that scoutmas-
ters are not supposed to speak about "sexuality,, 30 6 and Dale had
a stellar record of obeying scouting doctrine. 3 7 BSA's reliance,
then, was not on the facts of the specific case; it relied on - and
convinced the United States Supreme Court to believe - the idea
that gay men are "uncontrollable, 30 8 and thus incapable of
serving as scoutmasters without projecting this idea onto the
organization as a whole.3 °9
collapse the line between status and speech by using the terms 'avowed
homosexuals' or 'openly gay' persons.").
303 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449. BSA clearly succeeded. Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated at the outset: "Respondent is James Dale, a former Eagle Scout whose
adult membership in the Boy Scouts was revoked when the Boy Scouts learned
that he is an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist." Id. (emphasis added).
" See Brief for Petitioner at 24, Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (No. 99-699)
("Indeed, the very service of an openly gay person as a role model would convey
a message with which Boy Scouting does not wish to be associated.").
305 Brief for the Society of American Law Teachers at 8, Dale, 120 S. Ct.
2446 (No. 99-699) ("The Boy Scouts had no basis other than a stereotypical
presumption about gay men for believing that Dale would express any message
contrary to the Boy Scouts' views ... There is no basis in the record to believe
that Dale would ... advocate his own personal views about homosexuality.").
306 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2462 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing BSA's
policy of advising scouts to seek advice about sex from family members, and
recognizing that "Scoutmasters are, literally, the last person Scouts are
encouraged to ask" about sexuality).
307 Id. at 2449. Chief Justice Rehnquist himself recognized Dale's success:
"By all accounts, Dale was an exemplary Scout." Id.
308 See Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere, supra note 2, at 18.
" See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The only apparent explanation for the majority's holding, then, is that
homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that their
presence alone - unlike any other individual's - should be singled out
for special First Amendment treatment. Under the majority's reasoning,
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By accepting BSA's confusion of Dale's apparent "viewpoint"
and his status as a gay man, the Court missed the most obvious
opportunity to recognize the error of this conflation. In Runyon v.
McCrary, the Supreme Court rejected a private school's status-
based exclusion of a black child from a school that maintained the
belief that segregation was desirable. 310 The Court held that the
First Amendment protected the school's right to maintain its
viewpoint that segregation was desirable; what the First Amend-
ment would not support, much less condone, was the right of that
school to reject a child because he was black - a status-based
distinction.3" ' Similarly, the First Amendment should not be
derogated, as in Dale, such that it operates to protect an organiza-
tion's right to discriminate based on an individual's status as a gay
man.312 As the Runyon Court recognized: "[T]he Constitution ...
places no value on discrimination.. . . Invidious private discrimina-
tion may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of
association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never
been accorded affirmative constitutional protections. 3 3 Never,
that is, until now.
314
an openly gay male is irreversibly affixed with the label "homosexual."
That label, even though unseen, communicates a message that permits
his exclusion wherever he goes. His openness is the sole and sufficient
justification for his ostracism.
Id.
310 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976).
311 Id.
312 See Brief for the Society of American Law Teachers at 13, Dale, 120 S.
Ct. 2446 (No. 99-699) (noting that "complying with a mandate not to engage in
status-based discrimination does not require an endorsement of a belief in
anything").
313 Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176 (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,
469 (1973)).
314 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Under the majority's
reasoning, an openly gay male is irreversibly affixed with the label 'homosexu-
al.'. . . Though unintended, reliance on such a justification is tantamount to a
constitutionally prescribed symbol of inferiority."); see also Hunter, Accommo-
dating the Public Sphere, supra note 2, at 16. Professor Hunter argues that
Dale's holding "invites other organizations to quietly adopt resolutions of
disapproval of homosexuality and then use them, not to require adherence to a
philosophy, but simply to rid themselves of certain individuals, while leaving
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B. Within the Proper Freedom of Expressive Association
Framework, the Majority Goes Astray
On its facts, Dale was very much like Roberts: both organiza-
tions were national in scope; both were limited to men only; both
involved the exclusion of an individual because that person sought
access to an organization very much a part of modem American
culture.315 Of course, there also were differences: the Boy Scouts
did not have an explicit exclusionary policy regarding gay
men,316 whereas the Jaycees' policy of excluding women was
clear; 317 and the Jaycees case involved only adult members, while
the BSA case involved a man who had spent ten years of his
childhood as a member, and then was rejected soon after becoming
an adult member/leader.1 8 The issues were distinguishable
enough, however, that the United States Supreme Court believed it
could reject the essence of Roberts' holding, and embrace BSA's
desire to discriminate.3t 9
The Court's first significant departure from precedent was its
reinterpretion of the underlying constitutional right in question -
others who disagree.... This flatly contradicts the Court's holding in Runyon."
Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere, supra note 2, at 16.
315 See Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere, supra note 2, at 4 ("There
is probably no private organization in the country which so promotes itself as an
icon of citizenship as the Boy Scouts.").
316 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2470 ("BSA's mission statement and federal charter
say nothing on the matter [of homosexual membership]; its official membership
policy is silent; its Scout Oath and Law - and accompanying definitions - are
devoid of any view on the topic.").
317 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2469 n.15 (describing the exclusionary policies
in Rotary and Roberts).
"' See supra Part II (describing James Dale's history as a scout).
319 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2470 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
argued that the majority rejected the essence of the Roberts trilogy by not
applying its mandate in the Dale case. Id. Instead of asking whether Dale's
inclusion would "impose a 'serious burden' or a 'substantial restraint' upon the
group's 'shared goals,"' Justice Stevens argued that the majority's opinion
"pretermit[] this entire analysis." Id.
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the freedom of association. Roberts had reiterated32° a constitu-
tional ideal first articulated in De Jonge v. Oregon,32" ' and further
established in NAACP v. Alabama.322 The Dale majority, howev-
er, infused a "freedom of speech" concept from Hurley, and
reoriented the Roberts trilogy for good.323 As part of this reorien-
tation, the Court refused to look intently at the petitioner's claim
to find what was so essential in Roberts - a nexus between the
claimed right to exclude, and the group's reason for existence in
the first place.
Finally, the Court refused to recognize that the same discrimi-
nation that underscored the Jaycees' rejection of women as
members also supported BSA's rejection of James Dale: the kind
of "invidious discrimination" that the Roberts Court noted "cause[s]
unique evils that government has a compelling interest to pre-
vent.
324
1. First Amendment First Principles: The Freedom of
Association Is a Limited Constitutional Right
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in NAACP v. Alabama,
the right of expressive association flows from the First Amend-
ment's freedoms of speech and assembly.325 The rationalization
is that these rights cannot be protected fully against state interfer-
ence without the "correlative freedom to engage in group effort
toward those ends. 326 Thus, to speak collectively, a group of
people must be able to form as an organization to effectuate that
320 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23 (setting out the basic structure of the
right of association, and its correlative right to choose not to associate); see also
supra Part L.C (documenting the development of the Roberts trilogy).
321 299 U.S. 353 (1937); see also supra Part I.B.
322 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also supra Part I.B.
323 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454; see also Part II.C (discussing how the Court's
infusion of Hurley analysis changed the essence of the Roberts trilogy).
324 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
325 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); see also supra Part I.B (discussing the
development of the freedom of association).
326 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
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speech.3 7 The group's formation is then protected to the extent
that the group maintains "shared goals." '328 This limit to the
group's protected "speech" suggests the converse: those things
about which the group does not maintain "shared goals" cannot be
protected consequent to the First Amendment.329
The Court has recognized this limit on claimed First Amend-
ment rights.33° In the face of a compelling state interest, in fact,
the Court has held that even an infringement of membership rights
can be sustained,33' so long as the state regulation is "unrelated
to the suppression of ideas" and "cannot be achieved through
means significantly less restrictive. 332 Thus, after Roberts, when
a court acknowledged the existence of a compelling state interest,
enforced with a regulation that is unrelated to the suppression of
ideas, the group claiming a First Amendment defense must satisfy
the court that its expressive purpose would be so hampered by the
327 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 51, at 1118; see also Roberts, 468
U.S. at 623 (articulating how a legitimate state law "may impair the ability of the
original members to express only those views that brought them together");
William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U.L.
REV. 68, 80 (1986) ("Freedom of association is not protected for its own sake,
but only as a mechanism to promote other identifiable constitutional interests.").
328 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; see also Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2469 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The relevant question is whether the mere inclusion of the person
at issue would 'impose any serious burden,' 'affect in any significant way,' or
be 'a substantial restraint upon' the organization's 'shared goals,' 'basic goals,'
or 'collective effort to foster beliefs."').
329 See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. "Such a regulation may impair the
ability of the original members to express only those views that brought them
together." Id. (emphasis added).
310 See id. "The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however,
absolute." Id.
"' This, despite the fact that the Court has acknowledged that "[t]here can
be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an
association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not
desire." Id.
132 Id. "In other words, the regulation of association must be narrowly
tailored to promote an end that is unrelated to suppressing the message that will
be advanced by the association and is unrelated to suppressing the association
because of government disapproval of its purposes." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 51, at 1119.
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forced inclusion that it would not maintain its "shared goals. 333
To win on First Amendment grounds, "the organization or club
asserting the freedom has a substantial burden of demonstrating a
strong relationship between its expressive activities and its
discriminatory practice.,
334
The Dale majority clearly got this wrong.33S When faced with
the opportunity to delve into BSA's beliefs that accepting a
homosexual member would impact negatively on its ability to
accomplish its expressive purposes, the Court instead chose to
"give deference to an association's view of what would impair its
expression., 336 As the dissent noted, this is "an astounding view
of the law., 337 Justice Stevens noted the significance of this
remarkable shift:
I am unaware of any previous instance in which our
analysis of the scope of a constitutional right was deter-
mined by looking at what a litigant asserts in his or her
brief and inquiring no further. It is even more astonishing
in the First Amendment area, because, as the majority
itself acknowledges, "we are obligated to independently
review the factual record.,
338
If deference of this sort were sufficient, Roberts would never have
made it to the Supreme Court, and women still would be barred
from participating in the Jaycees. In order for the essence of
333 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. Of course, the court would also look to the
extent to which the state's interest cannot be achieved "through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." Id. at 623. In both
Roberts and Rotary, however, the Court found instances where the forced
inclusion of excluded members would not upset the expressive purpose of the
respective organizations. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 629; Rotary, 481 U.S. at 548.
114 Dale III, 706 A.2d at 287; see also Robert N. Johnson, Board of
Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte: Redefining
Associational Rights, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 141, 151-2 (1988) ("R[otary]
I[ntemational]'s claim would not be upheld unless it could demonstrate that a
significant purpose or objective would be adversely affected by admitting
women.").
335 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2469 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
336 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453.
13' Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2471 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (quoting the majority opinion, Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451).
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Roberts to remain, it is necessary that a court should determine
what compelling interest triumphs - that of a private organization
to maintain its own membership criteria, or that of a state to stamp
out unlawful discrimination among its citizenry.339 For a court to
accomplish this, it must assess for itself the organization's true
expressive purpose.
2. There Is No Adequate Nexus
In order to determine whether the forced inclusion of an
unwanted member will violate an organization's freedom of
association, a court must determine "whether the mere inclusion of
the person at issue would 'impose any serious burden,' 'affect in
any significant way,' or be 'a substantial restraint upon' the
organization's 'shared goals,' 'basic goals,' or 'collective effort to
foster beliefs.' ' 340 The Dale Court avoided this obligation articu-
lated in the Roberts trilogy, possibly because a careful analysis of
the nexus between BSA's expressive purpose and its desire to
exclude Dale would have shown the Court that Roberts' mandate
could not be satisfied.34'
The Dale Court instead chose to "accept the Boy Scouts'
assertion ' 341 that Dale's inclusion "would significantly affect the
Boy Scouts' ability to advocate public or private viewpoints,"
despite the Court's suggestion that it was in fact exploring BSA's
true expressive purpose. 3 In fact, the extent of its exploration of
BSA's expressive purpose included two abbreviated analyses: first,
... See Johnson, supra note 334, at 153 ("To determine whether a group's
expressive interests are protected courts will balance competing interests - the
state's interest in promoting equal access and eliminating damaging affects of
invidious discrimination against expressive interests of the private club.").
'40 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2469 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting from the
Roberts trilogy cases which defined the proper standard the Court should follow
when assessing the competing compelling interests).
141 See Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1226 ("When contrasted with its 'all-inclusive'
policy, Boy Scouts' litigation stance on homosexuality appears antithetical to the
organization's goals and philosophy.").
342 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453.
143 Id. ("This inquiry necessarily requires us first to explore, to a limited
extent, the nature of the Boy Scouts' view of homosexuality.").
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the Court accepted uncritically BSA's assertions that the Scout
Oath and Law evidenced a disapproval of homosexual conduct;
344
and finally, the Court looked to three position statements about
BSA's opinion of homosexuals in scouting, and found them
sufficiently indicative of BSA's stance.345 What the Court did not
31 Id. at 2452. The Court noted that BSA's assertion about the meaning of
the Oath and Law were open to interpretation, and at least one of those
interpretations could be that people "may believe that engaging in homosexual
conduct is contrary to being 'morally straight' and 'clean."' Id. The New Jersey
Supreme Court had rejected this possibility because they had looked at the entire
record of what BSA's expressive purpose was to inform its decision about the
extent of the harm imposed on that purpose by Dale's inclusion. See generally
Dale II, 734 A.2d 1196. This type of analysis, according to the Dale majority,
was inappropriate. "[O]ur cases reject this sort of inquiry; it is not the role of the
courts to reject a group's expressed values because they disagree with those
values or find them internally inconsistent." Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2452. Instead,
the Court stated, it was enough to "accept the Boy Scouts' assertion." Id.
145 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453. The Court initially stated that it was enough to
rely on BSA's assertion of its position on homosexuality as illustrated by the
Scout Oath and Law. It went ahead with analysis of the policy statements,
however, "because the record before [it] contain[ed] written evidence of the Boy
Scouts' viewpoint." Id. Its goal in undertaking the analysis was limited, however:
"we look to [the written evidence] as instructive, if only on the question of the
sincerity of the professed beliefs." Id. The majority's entire analysis of the
position statements was criticized severely in Justice Stevens' dissent:
Four aspects of the 1978 policy statement are relevant to the proper
disposition of this case. First, at most this letter simply adopts an
exclusionary membership policy. . . . Second, the 1978 policy was
never publicly expressed - unlike, for example, the Scout's duty to be
"obedient." . . . Third, it is apparent that draftsmen of the policy
statement foresaw the possibility that laws against discrimination might
one day be amended to protect homosexuals from employment
discrimination. Their statement clearly provided that, in the event such
a law conflicted with their policy, a Scout's duty to be "obedient" and
"obe[y] the laws," even if "he thinks [the laws] are unfair" would
prevail in such a contingency... Fourth, the 1978 statement simply
says that homosexuality is not "appropriate." It makes no effort to
connect that statement to a shared goal or expressive activity of the
Boy Scouts.
Id. at 2463-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The remaining position statements, all of
which were issued "after BSA revoked Dale's membership," had "little, if any,
relevance to the legal question before [the] Court." Id. at 2464. See also Marissa
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do, however, that surely would have made its ultimate holding
problematic, was to look to the complete record to determine,
objectively, BSA's true expressive purpose.
The most obvious starting point for this analysis would have
been to look to BSA's most prominent publication: the Boy Scout
Handbook ("Handbook"). Because of the nature of this analysis, the
Court should have considered its search akin to that of a prospec-
tive new scout: what does the Handbook, the primary educational
tool for new scouts, say about this organization in regard to its
expressive purpose?
34 6
One section in the Handbook mentions sexuality, titled "Sexual
Responsibility., 347 The section is a general prescription on a
young man's obligations, to himself and to others. There are four
sub-sections: "Your Responsibility to Young Women," "Your
Responsibility As a Future Parent," "Your Responsibility to Your
Beliefs," and "Your Responsibility to Yourself., 348 Throughout
the text, there are references to "marriage" and "pregnancy.
' 349
These notions, of course, rely on the assumption of heterosexuali-
ty.35° There is no language, however, that suggests a condemna-
tion of anything other than heterosexuality. BSA points to language
in the Scoutmaster Handbook that informs a scoutmaster as to what
to do in the instance where a scout is discovered in a sexual
situation with another Scout. 351' The language cited, however, only
L. Goodman, Note, A Scout Is Morally Straight, Brave, Clean, Trustworthy...
And Heterosexual? Gays in the Boy Scouts of America, 27 HOFsTRA L. REv.
825, 852-56 (1999) (discussing in detail the four position statements).
346 HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at iii ("The Boy Scout Handbook you are
holding is the road map to your Scouting adventure.").
347 HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 376-77. The sexuality materials are in the
chapter entitled, "Getting Along With Others." HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at
367-81.
348 HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 376-77.
349 HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 376-77. "[T]he difficulties created by an
unplanned pregnancy can be enormous.... Abstinence until marriage is a very
wise course of action." HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 376.
350 Marriage, as of this date, is limited of course to heterosexual couples. See
Pamela S. Katz, The Case for Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 8 J.L.
& POL'Y 61 (1999).
3' See Brief for Respondent at 15-16, Dale II, 734 A.2d 1196 (No. A-2427-
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points to an obvious problem when a scout is "using his Scouting
association to make contacts., 352 Nothing in the language con-
demns homosexuality itself as per se objectionable. What is defined
as wrong, apparently and understandably, is when a scout - and not
a scoutmaster - uses BSA in a predatory manner. This does not
concern homosexuality. It concerns the issue of a sexually
precocious child353 or, if the offender is a scoutmaster, the issue
of pedophilia.354
Other aspects of the Handbook suggest BSA's expressive
purpose. Three sections describe the issue of developing and
respecting community: "Citizenship," "Making the Most of
Yourself," and "Getting Along With Others. 355 Within the texts
on these pages, the Handbook defines a broad approach to the
tolerance of differences. In "Know Your Neighbors," the section
reads regarding "Ethnic Groups": "By accepting the differences
among us, you will realize the wonderful variety and strength that
different ethnic groups bring to a community., 35 6 A caption for
a picture in the "World Community" section reads, "Reaching out
to meet people who are different from you can lead to understand-
ing and friendship." '357 In bold print at the beginning of the
"Getting Along With Others" section, the Handbook states: "Over
270 million Americans share our nation. There are nearly 6 billion
people on the planet, all with their own needs, hopes, and dreams.
Learning about the extraordinary mix of cultures, histories, and
95T3). "Incidents of sexual experimentation that may occur in the troop could
run from the innocent to the scandalous. They call for a private and thorough
investigation, and frank discussion with those involved. It is important to
distinguish between youthful acts of innocence, and the practices of a confirmed
homosexual, who may be using his Scouting association to make contacts." Id.
352 Id.
13 In fact, the language in the Boy Scout Handbook, by implication,
recognizes that heterosexual boys can be sexually precocious as well - hence the
warning to avoid pre-marital sex. See HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 376-77.
... This is an argument that BSA does not make in its brief, but which it
implies in the essence of its argument.
355 HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 330-81.
356 HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 343.
357 HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 349.
BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. DALE
religions can be great fun, and can lead to a deeper understanding
of other people." '358
In "Meeting People," scouts are told that "[t]alking to a person
of a different race, religion, or generation might at first seem
awkward, but others are probably just as shy as you are. Focus on
making someone feel welcome, and you can open the door to
understanding and friendship. ' 359  Similarly, in "Choosing
Friends," the scout is told to "[l]ook beyond the differences that
might separate you from others and accept them for who they are.
You might be surprised how much you have in common and how
much your differences can enrich friendships., 36' And finally, the
Scout Law's definition of "clean" - the provision from which BSA
seeks to portray how its expressive purpose is inconsistent with
homosexuality - warns a scout about "foul language and harmful
thoughts and actions":
Swearwords and dirty stories are often used as weapons to
ridicule other people and hurt their feelings. The same is
true of racial slurs and jokes that make fun of ethnic
groups or people with physical or mental limitations. A
Scout knows there is no kindness or honor in such tasteless
behavior. He avoids it in his own words and deeds.36'
The general approach presented in the Handbook is one of
openness and acceptance to those who are different. Admittedly,
none of these sections preaches tolerance for gays. An argument
might be made that the issue of homosexuality is not appropriate
for young children - including the typical SCOUt. 362 On their own,
these positions espoused by BSA may not indicate anything
necessarily about the organization's expressive purpose. However,
these sections, combined with BSA's policy for including all
358 HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 367.
... HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 368.
360 HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 370.
361 HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 53; see supra note 198 for the remainder
of the Scout Law.
362 The Handbook is targeted to boys ages eleven through eighteen.
HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 4.
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boys,3 63 are strong evidence that the scope of BSA's expressive
purpose - its mission to inculcate strong values through camping,
etc. - is open to all boys, regardless of their sexual orientation.
364
As the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized, BSA is
"emphatically inclusive. 365 In the BSA pamphlet, A Representa-
tive Membership, BSA "states that its 'national objective, as well
as for regions, areas, councils, and districts is to see that all
eligible youth have the opportunity to affiliate with the Boy Scouts
of America.' 3 66 The United States Supreme Court bypassed this
analysis because recognizing it would have made its decision to
reject Roberts that much more problematic.
An accurate and detailed analysis of BSA's expressive purpose
would have shown that the organization does not associate to
discriminate against gay men.367 The position statements BSA
363 See Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1221 ("Any boy between the ages of eleven and
seventeen can join; indeed, Boy Scouts has quite clearly said that 'any boy' is
welcome."); see also id. at 1215 ("Neither the charter nor the bylaws of the Boy
Scouts of America permits the exclusion of any boy.") (quoting BSA pamphlet,
A Representative Membership, at 2).
364 In fact, BSA itself argues that questions of sexuality are better left for the
home. See Dale H, 734 A.2d at 1203. "BSA 'believes that boys should learn
about sex and family life from their parents, consistent with their spiritual
beliefs."' Id. (quoting an unidentified source).
365 Dale II, 734 A.2d at 1215. "Boy Scouts accepts boys who come from
diverse cultures and who belong to different religions. It teaches tolerance and
understanding of differences in others. . . . Its Charter and its Bylaws do not
permit the exclusion of any boy." Id. at 1217.
366 Id. at 1215 (emphasis added) (quoting the BSA pamphlet, A Representa-
tive Membership, at 1). An "eligible youth" is any boy eleven to eighteen years
of age, who has completed a BSA application and health history signed by parent
or guardian; has found a scout troop near his home; is able to repeat the pledge
of allegiance; can demonstrate the scout sign, salute and handshake; can
demonstrate tying the square knot; understands and agrees to live by the Scout
Oath and Law, Motto, Slogan and the outdoor code; can describe the scout
badge; has completed various pamphlet exercises, and has participated in a
scoutmaster conference. See HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 4.
367 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2470 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The evidence before this Court makes it exceptionally clear that BSA
has, at most, simply adopted an exclusionary membership policy and
has no shared goal of disapproving of homosexuality. . . . In short,
[BSA] is simply silent on homosexuality. There is no shared goal or
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relied upon to convince the Court that it does maintain a policy of
exclusion were irrelevant to the question of whether BSA's
expressive purpose would be burdened by Dale's inclusion.3 68 As
Justice Souter articulated in his dissent, "no group can claim a right
of expressive association without identifying a clear position to be
advocated over time in an unequivocal way., 369 Anything short
of this test would turn the First Amendment into a tool for
discrimination. The essence of Justice Souter's analysis is simple:
unless the nexus between the exclusion and the "shared goals" of
the organization is direct and obvious, the organization cannot
claim a First Amendment violation.37 °
3. Roberts Rejected the Same Discrimination Dale Embraces
The conflation at the heart of the Dale Court's decision37' is
not new to the Court. In Roberts, it faced the same issue,372 and
collective effort to foster a belief about homosexuality at all - let alone
one that is significantly burdened by admitting homosexuals.
Id.
368 Id.
369 Id. at 2479 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("To require less, and to allow
exemption from a public accommodations statute based on any individual's
difference from an alleged group ideal, however expressed and however
inconsistently claimed, would convert the right of expressive association into an
easy trump of any antidiscrimination law.").
311 Id. Justice Souter's argument makes a lot of the majority's analysis about
BSA's position statements irrelevant. For even if BSA had adopted a clear
policy, according to this analysis, it would not matter unless the essence of the
exclusionary policy related directly to the group's shared goals. See id. at 2469
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Given the organization's history and its general
approach to diversity, BSA would probably have to integrate anti-gay belief
systems into its methods of inculcating values in order to satisfy the standard
established in Roberts. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the type of discrimina-
tion found unlawful in Roberts).
371 See supra Part III.A (describing how BSA successfully convinced the
Court that Dale's status as a gay man would operate to project a viewpoint onto
BSA as an organization).
372 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627 (observing that "any claim that admission
of women as full voting members will impair a symbolic message conveyed by
the very fact that women are not permitted to vote is attenuated at best").
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its decision in rejecting the Jaycees' discriminatory posture was a
resolution in favor of the state's compelling interest.373 The
Roberts Court was asked to accredit the Jaycees' belief that
accepting women into their organization would result in a signifi-
cant change in the organization's positions on important issues,
because, as the Jaycees believed, including women "would
necessarily result in 'some change in the Jaycees' philosophical
cast.' 374 The Court went to great pains to analyze this reasoning,
and was clear in its assessment:
In claiming that women might have a different attitude
about such issues as the federal budget, school prayer,
voting rights, and foreign relations ... or that the organi-
zation's public positions would have a different effect if
the group were not "a purely young men's association," the
Jaycees relie[d] solely on unsupported generalizations
about the relative interests and perspectives of men and
women.
375
What the Roberts Court did was to disaggregate the same con-
flation the Dale Court embraced. Instead of accepting as "sincerely
held beliefs"3 76 that women would change the Jaycees' nature, the
Roberts Court found that these "unsupported generalizations" were
not worthy of constitutional protection.377 The Court rejected the
shorthand: "woman" equals unsound policies on political and social
issues. It rejected the notion that an organization could constitution-
ally conflate that a person's status - her gender - "said" anything
171 Id. at 624 ("That goal [of eliminating discrimination] ... plainly serves
compelling state interests of the highest order."); see also Rotary, 481 U.S. at
549. The Rotary Court, in fact, made a specific point of the fact that the state
public accommodation law in question, the Unruh Act, "makes no distinctions
on the basis of the organization's viewpoints." Id. The Court further noted:
"Moreover, public accommodations laws 'plainly serv[e] compelling state
interests of the highest order."' Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624).
114 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617 (quoting Jaycees I, 709 F.2d at 1571).
175 Id. at 627-28.
376 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453 ("We cannot doubt that the Boy Scouts
sincerely holds this view.").
17 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
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more than the fact that she was a woman. 78 This conflation was
the very core of what the Court found objectionable:
In the absence of a showing far more substantial than that
attempted by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the sexual
stereotyping that underlies appellee's contention that, by
allowing women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will
change the content or impact of the organization's speech.37 9
The Dale Court did more than take a different path in analyzing
similar facts; it rejected the very essence of what the Roberts Court
found so objectionable.3 80 Without overruling the Roberts trilogy,
the Court instead simply gutted it of its anti-discriminatory
power.38'
Beyond whether BSA holds a belief that homosexuality is
wrong, as analyzed under Roberts, the answer should not mat-
ter.3 82 What should matter are the reasons behind why BSA
wanted to exclude gay men. The answer to that question was never
answered by BSA in a way that should have satisfied the United
378 Id.
379 Id.
380 See supra Part II.C (discussing the way the Dale Court changed the
parameters of the law from Roberts).
381 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2470-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
If this Court were to defer to whatever position an organization is
prepared to assert in its briefs, there would be no way to mark the
proper boundary between genuine exercises of the right to associate,
on the one hand, and sham claims that are simply attempts to insulate
nonexpressive private discrimination, on the other hand.
Id. at 2471; see also Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere, supra note 2,
at 1 (suggesting that the Dale decision "may portend a substantial rewriting of
previous expressive association law because the Court seemed to lower the bar
for how clearly an organization had to demonstrate the tension between its ability
to communicate its beliefs and compliance with a civil rights law").
382 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2469 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is not enough to
adopt an openly avowed exclusionary membership policy."). In fact, in Roberts,
the Jaycees had an explicit policy that women were not allowed, and were clearly
on record in explaining their rationale. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 613-14. The
same was true for Rotary International. See Rotary, 481 U.S. at 539-41. This did
not present a problem in either instance, as the Court found that, despite these
policies, the underlying rationale was constitutionally infirm. See Rotary, 481
U.S. at 549; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
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States Supreme Court after Roberts383 - because all that BSA was
able to say was that gay male conduct was, in their eyes, unaccept-
able to scouting.384
Long before Roberts was decided, people used to believe that
women were incapable of being equal citizens such that they
should be denied certain benefits.385 What the Roberts Court did
was to say that these beliefs of inferiority were insufficient to
warrant constitutional protection in the face of compelling state
interests to eradicate discrimination: "We have repeatedly con-
demned legal decisionmaking that relies uncritically on such
assumptions. '386 It was time, the Court determined, to reject
gender inequality in the public accommodation sphere. Dale makes
it equally clear that apparently it is not time, according to the
Rehnquist Court, for the Constitution to afford the same assertion
of equality for gay men.387
383 Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2470 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued
that the majority rejected the analysis dictated by the Roberts trilogy, and ignored
the similarities that would have dictated a different outcome:
There is no reason to give [a BSA internal policy statement about
homosexuality] more weight than Rotary International's assertion that
all-male membership fosters the group's "fellowship" and was the only
way it could "operate effectively." As for BSA's post-revocation
statements, at most they simply adopt a policy of discrimination, which
is no more dispositive than the openly discriminatory policies held
insufficient in Jaycees and Rotary Club; there is no evidence here that
BSA's policy was necessary to - or even a part of- BSA's expressive
activities or was every [sic] taught to Scouts.
Id.
... Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2449 ("The Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual
conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill."); see also Brief for
Petitioner at 25, Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (No. 99-699) (describing "Boy Scouting's
Beliefs About Homosexual Conduct").
38 Certainly, many still believe so. It is without question that women remain
unequal, in many contexts, to men, despite laws asserting otherwise, or a Court
holding such actions to be unconstitutional.
386 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
387 See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2477-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Part VI of
his dissent, Justice Stevens described the way that developing ideas of acceptance
of gays and lesbians argued for a different opinion. See id. Chief Justice
Rehnquist clearly missed the point in rejecting this argument in the majority:
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CONCLUSION
The aftermath of Dale has proved that the decision can hardly
be seen as a success, from any perspective. BSA has been targeted
for maintaining its discriminatory policy, with private groups and
governmental organizations seeking to distance themselves from
BSA.388 Some have argued for trying to change the policy,
despite the Dale decision, given the strong and primarily negative
public reaction. 389 At least one of BSA's primary sponsors,
"Justice Stevens' dissent makes much of its observation that the public
perception of homosexuality in this country has changed ... But this is scarcely
an argument for denying First Amendment protection to those who refuse to
accept these views." Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2457. In rejecting Justice Stevens'
argument, clearly, Chief Justice Rehnquist is rejecting the rationale underlying
the Roberts analysis. An argument about the developing beliefs about minority
communities is not about justifying whether or not something deserves a First
Amendment protection. Rather, developing acceptance of minorities informs the
analysis about the "unsupported generalizations" and "archaic and overbroad
assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes" that the Roberts
Court found so constitutionally suspect. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628, 625.
388 See Laurie Goodstein, Jewish Group Recommends Cutting Ties to Boy
Scouts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001, at A12; Kate Zemike, Scouts' Successful Ban
on Gays Is Followed by Loss in Support, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2000, at Al;
Andrew Jacobs, Victory Has Consequences of Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2000, at A28.
389 See Claudia Kolker, Scouts Pledge to Persevere in Face of Opposition
to Ban on Gays Nationwide, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2000, at A5; Stuart Taylor Jr.,
Sure, They Can Exclude Gays. And Others - Even the President - Can Put
Pressure on Them, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000, at 76. A columnist at the
Chicago Sun-Times described his own approach to trying to affect change in
BSA's policy after the decision. See Mark Brown, Scouts' Honor Is Undermined
by Anti-Gay Policy, Cmc. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at 2. Mr. Brown described
how he initially believed that remaining in scouts with his children would be a
way "to work for change from within the group." Id. Mr. Brown changed his
mind when he discovered that BSA had revoked the charters of seven local scout
troops because those troops had informed the district offices that they were
obligated to follow the non-discrimination policies of the local schools where the
troops were affiliated. Id. Mr. Brown was shocked at BSA's stem reply: "If
you're not willing to discriminate against gays, the Boy Scouts don't want you.
Oak Park's tolerance is not to be tolerated." Id.
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however - the Mormon Church - has stated that it would "with-
draw from Scouting" if BSA admitted "openly homosexual scout
leaders. 39°
The future of freedom of association law, and the power of
Roberts in particular, may be the greater loss. To come to the
conclusion that Dale was different from Roberts, the Court had to
reorient Roberts' holding.39' In doing so, the Court undermined
some of the states' power to outlaw discrimination. As Justice
Stevens noted in his dissent, the warnings of Justice Brandeis are
especially relevant to the Dale Court's actions. "To stay [a state's]
experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsi-
bility., 392 New Jersey's public accommodation law is an experi-
ment in the process, and the Dale majority's actions stopped that
experiment dead in its tracks - at least in how it relates to gay men
in this context. Unless and until the United States Supreme Court
overturns Dale, it will be constitutional to discriminate against gay
men; the decision has "irreversibly affixed" them with "a constitu-
tionally prescribed symbol of inferiority. 3 93 Chief Justice Rehn-
3 Brief of National Catholic Committee on Scouting, General Commission
on United Methodist Men of the United Methodist Church, the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, and the
National Council of Young Israel at 25, Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (No. 99-699).
According to their amici brief, the Mormon Church is "the largest single sponsor
of Scouting units in the United States." Id. The other amici signing the brief
warned of additional consequences to such a move: "The other amici would be
forced to reevaluate their sponsorship of Scouting, with the serious possibility of
reaching the same conclusion." Id.
"9 Dale was one in a series of cases decided recently which some
commentators have suggested is illustrative of the fact that "[w]e are now in the
midst of a remarkable period of right-wing judicial activism." Cass R. Sunstein,
Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at A23. Others have
suggested that this rightward path is in fact an attempt to role back all of the
federal anti-discrimination statutes, including Title VI. See David G. Savage, Bias
Claims Get Same 5-4 Answer from Justices: No Law: Discrimination Cases Are
Consistent Losers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001, at Al.
392 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2459 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'9' Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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quist's Court ignored Justice Brandeis' warnings, and "erect[ed its]
prejudices into legal principles. 394
194 New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 311.

